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"AND THE WISDOM TO KNOW THE DIFFERENCE":
CONFIDENTIALITY VS. PRIVILEGE
IN THE SELF-HELP SETTING
JESSICA G. WEINERt
INTRODUCTION
On New Year's Eve of 1988, Paul Cox drank beer and kamikazes
at a bar called Garry's Barleycorn in New Rochelle, New York. On
the way home he was involved in a car accident and walked 2 9
miles to the house where he used to live with his parents. He broke
in, got a knife from the kitchen, went up to the bedroom where his
mother and father once slept, and murdered Shanta and Lakshman
Rao Chervu. Cox stole nothing-he just slashed the throats of the
two innocent victims. Cox then went to his parents' house in
Larchmont, New York, and went to sleep. When he woke up, he
remembered nothing from the night before. The police found
fingerprints at the scene, but since Cox had never before been
arrested, there was nothing to match.
Four years later, Coxjoined Alcoholics Anonymous ("A.A."). "It
is part of the 12 steps of the AA [process] to search for somebody
and start telling him your past, to admit guilt."1 At the time, Cox
was rooming with a young man and woman, both A.A. members.
He told them and other A.A. members that he dreamed he had
committed a crime. Later, he said that "he believed he had done it,
but he had no real recollection of the night. He remembered
finding a bloody knife and throwing it in the water."2 One member
of A.A. went to the police via an intermediary. That member gave
the names of other A.A. members who had been privy to the
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information and informed the police that Cox had been having
dreams or dream fragments of killing the Chervus.
Cox was charged with double homicide in 1993. In June 1994,
seven A.A. members were compelled by subpoena to testify. Judge
Cowhey, the presiding judge, refused to allow the A.A. members to
claim a privilege as an extension of either the priest-penitent or the
spousal privileges.4 Instead, he held that New York law does not
extend a testimonial privilege to self-help groups. Although the
A.A. members maintained that they were bound by A.A. principles
5
to protect Cox's confidences, all seven were ordered to testify. They
were not required to disclose their full names, and no press pictures
of the seven witnesses were allowed.6
The trial resulted in a deadlock.7 All but one woman, who held
out for a lesser manslaughter charge, voted to convict for second-
degree murder.' On December 6, 1994, after the second trial, Cox
was convicted of manslaughter. Thejury found that Cox "had been
affected by extreme emotional disturbance."9 The defendant
admitted to the killings but claimed he had done so in an alcoholic
blackout. Judge Cowhey gave Cox the maximum sentence on March
14, 1995.10
Numerous self-help groups have expressed outrage at the
ruling." A.A. has not taken an official stand on the decision
because of its desire to remain focused solely on the problem of
alcoholism without taking political stances on any outside issues;
12
'See Joseph Berger, Carpenter Guilty of Manslaughter in 1988 Slayings in
Larchmont, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1994, at BI; Breslin, supra note 1, at A2.
" See Marjorie Rosen, The Blackout, PEOPLE, July 11, 1994, at 67, 69; see also
Geraldine Baum, The Secrets of Your Soul, L.A. TIMES, June 24, 1994, at El, E7
(discussing the priest-penitent and psychotherapist-patient privileges). For a more
complete discussion of the priest-penitent and spousal privileges, see infra part
II.B.2-.3.
'See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
6 See Rosen, supra note 4, at 69.
See Debra West, Man Gets Maximum Term for Killings in Larchmont, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 15, 1995, at B8.
'See Rosen, supra note 4, at 69.
'Berger, supra note 3, at BI.
10 The sentence was 16% to 50 years in prison. See West, supra note 7, at B8.
n See Jan Hoffman, Faith in Confidentiality of Therapy Is Shaken, N.Y. TIMES,
June 15, 1994, at Al; Rosen, supra note 4, at 69. The breach of A.A.'s code of
secrecy unsettled members of A.A. and therapists around the country. Frank
Riessman, director of the National Self-Help Clearinghouse, reported that his office
received over 70 calls per week regarding the ruling and that people were very
disturbed by it. See id.
12 See ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS WORLD SERVS., INC., TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE
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however, various members of A.A. have talked to the press. One
member stated that A.A. was not "above the law," S and another
stated that part of the A.A. process is taking responsibility for one's
actions.14 At least one member felt otherwise:
The first time my wife made me go to the meeting in our neigh-
borhood in Brooklyn, I go [sic] to the corner bar and stand pat all
night .... But [eventually,] I went back. The place gave me my life
back. I must have sent a thousand people there. If one of them
ever heard that anything they say gets repeated, and don't give
them any reasons, then they'd never come back. The same for
me.
15
Another member, who is a priest, explained:
The confidentiality at AA is almost the same as the confessional
.... [I]f you don't have [confidentiality] at an AA meeting, then
we are all threatened. As I understand it, they subpoenaed people
for a double homicide. That's rare. But once you make Alcohol-
ics Anonymous people talk about one thing, what is to stop the
authorities from deciding that they can come around for anything,
an income tax case. Therefore, is a double murder more impor-
tant than the confidentiality of AA? There had to be a better way
to solve this case.
16
One member, who felt that A.A.'s promise of confidentiality is
not inviolable, admitted that he had "heard numerous confessions
to crimes from petty theft to burglary to drunken driving," and
admitted that it is "a matter of individual conscience what you
ought to do when you hear such things."' 7 Finally, one member of
Cocaine Anonymous, irate about the fact that privileges are
extended to psychotherapists but not to peer counselors, exclaimed,
"This just points out another middle-class hypocrisy-money buys
privacy.... If you have the money, you can have the protection. A
lot of people in [Cocaine Anonymous] can't afford a fancy
shrink.""8
TRADIONS 176-79 (1981) [hereinafter TWELVE STEPS] (explaining Tradition Ten-the
policy that A.A. should never become involved in public controversies because that
might cause dissension within the group); see also infra note 65 (listing the Twelve
Steps of behavioral change and the Twelve Traditions of A.A.)
'" Breslin, supra note 1, at A2.
14 See Confidentiality & Crime, USA TODAY, June 10, 1994, at 10A.
Is Breslin, supra note 1, at A2.
16 Id.
17 Baum, supra note 4, at E7.
18 Id.
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Interestingly, the name of the A.A. member who told on Cox
was not revealed to the press. That person breached not only Cox's
anonymity but also the anonymity of the other persons who were
later forced to testify. 9 Although the full names of the A.A.
witnesses were withheld from the people attending the trial, their
identities were readily apparent to the judge and to the jurors at
both trials.
20
The reaction to the trial indicates the general expectation that
people will not breach the confidence that exists within the self-help
group. Although no explicit contractual obligation exists between
members of A.A. or other self-help groups,21 there is an assump-
tion that some kind of legal protection exists for members of A.A.
One woman, when asked if she thought a court could gain access to
information disclosed at an A.A. meeting answered quite certainly,
"Oh no, it all stays here.... They can't make me testify about what
someone shared at a meeting."22 But, in fact, unless she is willing
to go to jail to defend that position, she can be compelled to testify.
The decision to turn to self-help groups for assistance is
becoming more and more common. People are turning to self-help
or mutual aid groups2 3 as a means of dealing with various prob-
lems ranging from dealing with drug and alcohol addiction 24 to
contending with life after divorce or the death of a loved one.
25
As part of the "treatment" provided by these mutual aid groups,
members of the group share details of their lives and experiences
9 See Breslin, supra note 1, at A2.
2' See Rosen, supra note 4, at 69.
21 See Baum, supra note 4, at E7; see also Paul S. Appelbaum & Alexander
Greer, Confidentiality in Group Therapy, 44 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 311,
312 (1993) (explaining that courts would have difficulty imposing obligations of
confidentiality on group members unless the group members had signed a contract
"binding them to maintain the confidentiality of the group and imposing financial
penalties for noncompliance").
Hoffman, supra note 11, at Al.
s The use of the term "self-help" has been rejected in some psychological circles
in favor of the term "mutual aid," because of the emphasis the latter places on the
importance of peer support. See, e.g., HARRY WASSERMAN & HOLLY E. DANFORTH,
THE HUMAN BOND: SUPPORT GROUPS AND MUTUAL AID 22-23 (1988). This
Comment, however, uses these terms interchangeably.
24 See Celestine Bohlen, Support Groups Are Offering Embrace to Cocaine's
Victims, N.Y. TIMEs,Jan. 29, 1989, at 1 (noting that drug and alcohol support groups
have proliferated across the country).
2- For example, many divorcees turn to groups like Parents Without Partners.
Widowed Persons is a self-help group for people who have lost their spouses. See
ALAN GARTNER & FRANK RIESSMAN, HELP: A WORKING GUIDE TO SELF-HELP GROUPS
156-57 (1980).
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in dealing with a particular problem. Most of the self-help groups
serve as a private place where people divulge their innermost
thoughts and secrets, secure in the knowledge that what they reveal
within the group is not disclosed outside of the group, even to a
court of law.26  That sense of security is misplaced. Under the
current law, only certain communications are protected from
discovery sought during litigation" and communications made in
the mutual aid context do not qualify.
2
The evidentiary rules of privilege, unlike most rules of evidence,
"operate to exclude relevant, nonprejudicial and nonconfusing evi-
dence."2 9 The system of privileges does not operate to aid in the
quest for truth but rather to create and protect a realm of privacy
thought necessary to protect and allow for the adequate functioning
of certain relationships. 0 The successful functioning of those
relationships within our society is deemed more important than the
availability of evidence for the administration of justice.
s
3
This Comment advocates extending a legal privilege to those
highly focused self-help groups that require anonymity and
confidentiality in order to provide effective treatment for their
members. Part I of this Comment discusses self-help groups
generally, compares them to other forms of therapy or counseling,
" See infra notes 105-24 (noting that confidentiality is a foundational element
of the self-help therapeutic process and that this confidentiality is essential to the
success of such programs).
Not all relationships that are private or even confidential are granted
"privileged" status. Many people confuse confidentiality with privilege. "Confidenti-
ality" is a moral construct, whereas "privilege" is a legal construct created by ad hoc
policyjudgments. "'Privilege is an exception to the general rule that the public has
a right to every man's evidence.' Confidentiality 'is an ethic that protects the client
from unauthorized disclosure of information about the client'. ... The presence of
confidentiality alone is not enough to support a privilege." CatharinaJ.H. Dubbelday,
Comment, The Psychotherapist-Client Testimonial Privilege: Defining the
Professional Involved, 34 EMORY L.J. 777, 780-81 (1985) (footnotes omitted). For
a discussion of those communications that are protected with a legal privilege, see
infra notes 155-204 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 155-204 and accompanying text (describing currently
recognized privileges).
2 See ERIC D. GREEN & CHARLES R. NESSON, PROBLEMS, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON EVIDENCE 689 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing how privilege law impedes the truth-
finding process).
s See id. at 692; see also Hoffman, supra note 11, at Al (extracting the
principle behind privilege law that "certain relationships should remain off limits to
courts").
" See Irwin N. Perr, Privacy, Privileged Communications, and Confidentiali-
ty, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN AMERICAN PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAw 263, 264 (Richard
Rosner ed., 1982).
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and addresses the importance of confidentiality within the self-help
setting. Self-help groups are vital to certain segments of the
population. Their success rates are unsurpassed for certain types of
treatment, and they make the experiential model of therapy
available to those who might not benefit from more traditional
methods of treatment.3 2 Part II discusses the different rationales
underlying privilege rules, and explains the current state of privilege
law. Part III of this Comment demonstrates the application to the
self-help context of the various theories used to explain modem
privilege law. Part IV addresses the counterarguments made by
critics of the expansion of privilege law, explains why they are
inapplicable or misguided in the self-help setting, and describes, in
light of the counterarguments, the nature of the privilege suggested.
This Comment concludes with a plea to the courts and the legisla-
tures to create such a privilege so that members of these support
groups can continue to utilize self-help groups with the assurance
that their statements will be protected.
I. THE SELF-HELP GROUP
A. Defining Self-Help Groups: A Therapeutic Necessity
Although no one can give an exact number, there are at least
500,000 self-help groups operating in the United States with at least
10 million members."3 Self-help groups provide an alternative to
other types of therapy. As defined by Alfred Katz and Eugene
Bender,
3 4
[s]elf-help groups are voluntary, small group structures for mutual
aid and the accomplishment of a special purpose. They are usually
formed by peers who have come together for mutual assistance in
satisfying a common need, overcoming a common handicap or life-
disrupting problem, and bringing about desired social and/or
personal change. The initiators and members of such groups
"2 See infra notes 42-52 and accompanying text.
33 See ALFRED H. KATZ, SELF-HELP IN AMERICA: A SOCIAL MOVEMENT PERSPECTIVE
1 (1993); Thomas J. Powell, Preface to WORKING WITH SELF-HELP at vii (Thomas J.
Powell ed., 1990).
' Alfred H. Katz and Eugene I. Bender are two well-respected professors who
have cowritten two very influential books about the self-help movement. See ALFRED
H. KATZ & EUGENE I. BENDER, HELPING ONE ANOTHER: SELF-HELP GROUPS IN A
CHANGING WORLD (1990); ALFRED H. KATZ & EUGENE I. BENDER, THE STRENGTH IN
US: SELF HELP GROUPS IN THE MODERN WORLD (1976) [hereinafter KATZ & BENDER,
THE STRENGTH IN US].
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perceive that their needs are not, or cannot be, met by or through
existing social institutions. Self-help groups emphasize face-to-face
social interactions and the assumption of personal responsibility
by members. They often provide material assistance, as well as
emotional support; they are frequently "cause" oriented, and
promulgate an ideology or values through which members may
attain an enhanced sense of personal identity5 5
People choose to attend self-help group meetings instead of seeking
professional assistance for numerous reasons. First, private
professional counseling is more costly than group therapy 6 and
many insurance plans do not cover psychological treatment. 7 Self-
help groups, like A.A., are known as "the white middle class thera-
py"38 or the "'poor man's [sic] psychotherapy. ' " 9 Most support
groups do not charge fees for the right to participate and, if they
do, those fees are normally quite nominal.4" Self-help programs
"fill the gaps left by the shortage of space available in publicly
financed treatment programs. "41 Because groups like A.A. are
inexpensive, if not free, they provide a welcoming alternative to
costly professional private treatment. This means that a person who
is looking for treatment but who has limited resources might turn
to a mutual aid group because of her economic circumstances.
Second, depending on the kind of problem one confronts, self-
help may be the most effective means of coping. Self-help organiza-
tions claim a better track record than professionals for detoxifying
substance and alcohol abusers and for helping people cope with
intense grief reactions or emergency panic situations.4 2 Further-
-1 WASSERMAN & DANFORTH, supra note 23, at 23 (quoting KATZ & BENDER, THE
STRENGTH IN Us, supra note 34, at 9).
' See Dubbelday, supra note 27, at 810 (noting that group therapy is much more
cost effective).
" See Nicholas A. Cummings, Mental Health and National Health Insurance:
A Case History of the Struggle for Professional Autonomy, in PSYCHOLOGY AND
NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE: A SOURCEBOOK 1, 14-15 (Charles A. Kiesler et al.
eds., 1979) (describing the struggle of psychologists to obtain insurance-industry
recognition).
' Telephone Conversation with Public Information Department Representative,
Alcoholics Anonymous Worldwide Services (Jan. 3, 1995); see also Linda F. Kurtz,
Twelve.Step Programs, in WORKING WITH SELF-HELP, supra note 33, at 93, 116.
39 Douglas A. Luke et al., Individua4 Group Contex and Individual-Group Fit
Predictors of Self-Help Group Attendance, in UNDERSTANDING THE SELF-HELP
ORGANIZATION 88,88 (Thomasj. Powell ed., 1994) (quoting Charles Leerhsen et al.,
Unite and Conquer, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 5, 1990, at 50, 51).
40 See DANIEL REMINE ET AL., SELF-HELP GROUPS AND HUMAN SERVICE AGENCIES:
How THEY WORK TOGETHER 16 (1984) (stating that self-help groups are usually free).
41 Bohlen, supra note 24, at 34.
42 See THOMAS J. POWELL, SELF HELP ORGANIZATIONS AND PROFESSIONAL
250 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 144:243
more, the decision to attend self-help may be a result of individual,
private, professional treatment." Although professional counsel-
ors may help a troubled individual to cope with a problem, a self-
help group may be more beneficial for long-term, ongoing support.
Third, the decision to join a self-help group may be prompted
by a desire for experiential, instead of professional, therapy.
Experiential knowledge is defined as "information and wisdom
gained from lived experience. " " Experiential knowledge has two
critical components: specific, pragmatic wisdom "gained through
reflection upon personal lived experience,"4 5 and belief in the
value of the knowledge obtained from that experience and its worth
to others dealing with a common problem.46 Experiential knowl-
edge differs from lay knowledge
47 and professional knowledge.
48
Experiential knowledge focuses on the practical means of dealing
with a problem by people who themselves have experienced the
problem, whereas lay knowledge focuses on second-hand informa-
tion and professional knowledge on academic theories of behavioral
responses. Depending on the individual and the problem, the
person may be better served by the assistance of a mutual aid group
than by someone with professional knowledge.
49
Finally, the role of the client is very different in each of the
settings. In the self-help context, the participant is both helping
and being helped. She views the others in the group as peers and
PRACTICE 140 (1987).
4 See id. at 139; see also ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS WORLD SERVS., 1992
MEMBERSHIP SURVEY PAMPHLET (stating that 80% of members who received
counseling before coming to A.A. said their previous counseling experiences directed
them to A.A.).
"4 Marsha A. Schubert & Thomasina Borkman, Identifying the Experiential
Knowledge Developed Within a Self-Help Group, in UNDERSTANDING THE SELF-HELP
ORGANIZATION, supra note 39, at 227, 228.
45 Id.
46 See id.
47 Lay knowledge is knowledge learned incidentally, learned second-hand from
professionals, family members, the mass media, common sense, or logic. See id.
48 Professional knowledge is defined as "information, knowledge, and skills
developed, applied, and transmitted by an established specialized occupation" to those
who have fulfilled the requirements of a profession. Thomasina J. Borkman,
Experientia Professional and Lay Frames of Reference, in WORKING WITH
SELF-HELP, supra note 33, at 3, 6.49 See id. at 8-21, 29 (explaining that self-help groups provide experiential
knowledge that involves a special understanding between people with similar
problems and that cannot be gained by professional help); see also POWELL, supra
note 42, at 132-34 (noting that some people prefer self-help groups because of the
solidarity they feel with persons in similar situations).
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knows that she will be welcomed and not told what to do. In the
professional context, the participant is fully aware that she is paying
someone to listen to her. She has different expectations. The
relationship is not mutual, and the therapist, no matter how
empathetic, is not going through the same experience as the
patient.50 Some people might prefer to pay a fee in order to free
themselves from the responsibility of helping others, and those
people will choose to see a professional therapist. Others, however,
are uncomfortable with what they perceive as "paying for a friend."51
Self-help serves a valuable function for individuals who might forgo
therapy altogether if the only alternative is professional help. This
is especially true if these same individuals are not reluctant to
discuss personal issues in a group setting.
Self-help groups may, therefore, be the best, or the only,
alternative for certain segments of society. They serve an important
function by providing therapeutic help or "treatment" to people
who might otherwise be unable or unwilling to seek professional
assistance. 2
B. Self-Help Groups: A Typology
Self-help groups differ significantly from one another.53 There
are primarily two different ways of classifying self-help groups: by
methodology or by primary focus. Katz and Bender differentiate
groups on the basis of their focus, having either an "inner focus" or
an "outer focus."54 An inner-focused group is centered on its
members and devoted to their concerns. An outer-focused group
stresses societal goals.55 Leon Levy classifies self-help groups into
' See POWELL, supra note 42, at 119-28 (explaining the differences in the process
of group therapy as compared with the process of professional counseling).
" Id. at 125-27 (describing how the self-help relationship is more mutual in nature
and, thus, clients seeking autonomy and mutuality will choose self-help over
professional counseling).
52 See id. at 120, 132-34 (explaining that self-help leaders are unpaid and that the
groups provide a level of acceptability not experienced by some people in a
professional environment).
' Classifying self-help groups is important because understanding the differences
and the overlap between groups makes it clearer why only certain self-help groups
merit the protection of a legal privilege.
5 See REMINE ET AL., supra note 40, at 12 (explaining the Katz and Bender
approach); supra note 34 (same).
" See REMINE ET AL., supra note 40, at 12 (explaining that welfare reform and
acceptance of alternative lifestyles arejust some of the goals stressed by outer-focused
groups).
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four categories according to the group's purpose and composi-
tion.56  "Type I groups emphasize conduct reorganization or
behavioral control."57 Type II groups are those that strive to help
members ameliorate, not change, a stressful predicament. Type III
groups are survival-oriented, comprised of those against whom
society discriminates or whom society labels deviant. 8 "Members
of Type IV groups share goals of personal growth, self-actualization,
and enhanced effectiveness in life."5 9
There are primarily two types of self-help group methodologies:
the twelve-step and the non-twelve-step paradigms.' Levy's four
types of groups overlap with both methodologies; a twelve-step
group may be a Type I behavioral modification group like A.A. or
a Type II stress amelioration group like Cancer Anonymous.
61
Furthermore, all four types can fit into the non-twelve-step
model.62
1. Alcoholics Anonymous and the Twelve-Step Paradigm
A.A. is the prototype for all twelve-step groups.61 The organi-
zation, founded in the late 1930s, has the largest number of
members of any self-help group, and its success has prompted the
56See id. at 13 (explaining Leon Levy's four-part typology of self-help groups).
57 Id.
58 See id. at 13-14.
59 
Id. at 14.
60 Researchers have categorized or classified self-help groups in many different
ways. For an extensive discussion of a breakdown by missions of self-help organiza-
tions, see POWELL, supra note 42, at 147-247, app. I. For purposes of organizational
convenience, this Comment delineates only the two primary categories. Not all self-
help groups can.be so easily categorized. In order to fully understand the mission,
goals, and types of assistance provided by each group, it is important to make a
group-by-group assessment. See generally GARTNER & RIESSMAN, supra note 25
(providing a helpful guide of self-help groups for such an assessment). The
classification of self-help groups is important for purposes of this Comment in order
to ascertain which self-help groups merit a privilege and which can successfully
function without such legal protection. See infra part IV.A.
61 See ROBERT ADAMS, SELF-HELP, SOCIAL WORK AND EMPOWERMENT 3-4 (1990)
(describing different classifications of self-help groups and providing a vast array of
examples).
62 This Comment advocates extension of a privilege only to those groups that are
Type I, twelve-step self-help groups. For a more complete discussion of why the
privilege should be limited to these groups, see infra part II.A (discussing the
rationales for current privilege doctrine); infra part IV.A (discussing the proposed
privilege).
' See Kurtz, supra note 38, at 93 (discussing how A.A. serves as a model for many
other organizations).
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formation of other groups designed to deal with various addictions,
including Overeaters Anonymous ("O.A.") (founded in 1965),
Gamblers Anonymous ("G.A.") (in 1970), Narcotics Anonymous
("N.A.") (in 1953), and Cocaine Anonymous ("C.A.") (in 1979).'
A.A.'s founders formed a twelve-step and twelve-tradition develop-
mental strategy designed to help each member overcome the urge
to drink.65 Meetings customarily begin with the Serenity Prayer,'
See KATz, supra note 33, at 10.
The Twelve Steps are:
Step One
"We admitted we were powerless over alcohol-that our lives had
become unmanageable."
Step Two
"Came to believe that a Power greater than ourselves could restore us
to sanity."
Step Three
"Made a decision to turn our will and our lives over to the care of G[-]d
as we understood Him."
Step Four
"Made a searching and fearless moral inventory of ourselves."
Step Five
"Admitted to G[-]d, to ourselves, and to another human being the exact
nature of our wrongs."
Step Six
"Were entirely ready to have G[-]d remove all these defects of
character."
Step Seven
"Humbly asked Him to remove our shortcomings."
Step Eight
"Made a list of all persons we had harmed, and became willing to make
amends to them all."
Step Nine
"Made direct amends to such people wherever possible, except when
to do so would injure them or others."
Step Ten
"Continued to take personal inventory and when we were wrong
promptly admitted it."
Step Eleven
"Sought through prayer and meditation to improve our conscious
contact with G[-]d as we understood Him, praying only for knowledge
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of His will for us and the power to carry that out."
Step Twelve
"Having had a spiritual awakening as the result of these steps, we tried
to carry this message to alcoholics, and to practice these principles in
all our affairs."
TWELVE STEPS, supra note 12, at 5-8. The Twelve Traditions are:
Tradition One
"Our common welfare should come first; personal recovery depends
upon A.A. unity."
Tradition Two
"For our group purpose there is but one ultimate authority-a loving
G[-]d as He may express Himself in our group conscience. Our leaders
are but trusted servants; they do not govern."
Tradition Three
"The only requirement for A.A. membership is a desire to stop
drinking."
Tradition Four
"Each group should be autonomous except in matters affecting other
groups or A.A. as a whole."
Tradition Five
"Each group has but one primary purpose-to carry its message to the
alcoholic who still suffers."
Tradition Six
"An A.A. group ought never endorse, finance, or lend the A.A. name
to any related facility or outside enterprise, lest problems of money,
property, and prestige divert us from our primary purpose."
Tradition Seven
"Every A.A. group ought to be fully self-supporting, declining outside
contributions."
Tradition Eight
"Alcoholics Anonymous should remain forever non-professional, but
our service centers may employ special workers."
Tradition Nine
"A.A., as such, ought never be organized; but we may create service
boards or committees directly responsible to those they serve."
Tradition Ten
"Alcoholics Anonymous has no opinion on outside issues; hence the
A.A. name ought never be drawn into public controversy."
Tradition Eleven
"Our public relations policy is based on attraction rather than
promotion; we need always maintain personal anonymity at the level of
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followed by a formal statement defining the group and its goals
which usually includes a general statement that "whatever is said in
the room stays in the room" and a discussion of the importance of
anonymity and confidentiality."' The meeting continues with new
member "introductions," a reading from the A.A. "Big Book,"6"
and the "pitches" from various members who share stories of their
problems and how they are dealing with their addictions.
The twelve-step programs are prominent and well-publicized. 9
Twelve-step groups emphasize a strong ideology based on the
concept that personal change can only be achieved through spiritual
belief or conversion."' Members need to relinquish control in
order to adopt new empowering behaviors.7 ' Overcoming addic-
tion is the singular goal within the twelve-step program. The focal
concern is "the members' obsessive preoccupation with something
to the point where that focus takes over a major part of their
lives.... One reaches bottom when one becomes so defeated in the
obsession that one can no longer continue it without suffering grave
emotional, social, or physical consequences."72 A.A.'s goal is to
deal with that preoccupation.
7 3
press, radio, and films."
Tradition Twelve
'Anonymity is the spiritual foundation of all our traditions, ever
reminding us to place principles before personalities."
Id. at 9-13.
The Serenity Prayer is: "G[-]d, grant me the serenity to accept the things I
cannot change, the courage to change the things I can and the wisdom to know the
difference." Kurtz, supra note 38, at 100.
617 See KATZ, supra note 33, at 27.
' The "Big Book," as it is commonly referred to, is one of the two books group
members are asked to purchase. The Big Book tells of A.A.'s founding and then lists
several stories of people who recovered by embracing the twelve-step principles. See
ALCOHoucs ANONYMOUS WORLD SERVS., INC., ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS (3d ed.
1976) [hereinafter ALCOHOLicS ANONYMOUS]. The other book members are asked
to buy is Twelve Steps and Twelve Traditions. See TWELVE STEPS, supra note 12;
cf. Overeaters Anonymous, Orientation for New Sponsors (n.d.) (unpublished
document, on file with author) (assigning readings in O.A.'s Big Book).
' 9 See KATZ, supra note 33, at 13 (noting A.A.'s worldwide recognition).
70 See Kurtz, supra note 38, at 116 (stating that "[t]welve-[s]tep groups hold in
common the idea ofspiritual growth as an antidote to unhealthy and obsessive efforts
to control pain and anxiety").
71 See TWELVE STEPS, supra note 12, at 21 (discussing Step One, which requires
one to admit that she is powerless over the problem of alcoholism).
7Kurtz, supra note 38, at 97-98.
73 See TWELVE STEPS, supra note 12, at 150 (describing Tradition Five and A.A.'s
singular purpose to help the suffering alcoholic).
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Another important tenet of the twelve-step program is the
specific prohibition against taking action on political or outside
issues.74 Twelve-step groups take no position on public issues or
legislation, even if the legislation relates to the addiction;7 5 the
rationale is that the group is designed solely to help each individual
with her addiction. The treatment is highly specific. For the
members of most twelve-step programs, the goal is sobriety. In this
context, sobriety does not mean mere abstinence from alcohol or
other compulsions, but rather refers to abstinence coupled with a
fundamental change in behavior.76 Once the member concedes
she has no control over her habit, she surrenders to it and learns to
live a moderate and serene life. The twelve-step programs are part
of an ongoing process.7 7 One does not conquer the addiction, and
a change in behavior does not mean that the person is cured. The
person is always in a continuous process of learning about herself
and recovering. 7' There is no judgment involved when one "falls
off the wagon." Failure is an expected and accepted part of the
growth process. The amount of time spent in the program varies
considerably by person. 79 Many people who leave the twelve-step
program return to it at a later point in their lives.
8 0
A.A. is strongly influenced by religion since it incorporates
much of the Protestant Oxford Group methodology into its
program." The A.A. growth process requires "self-disclosure of
personal failures and transgressions, making restitution to the
people one ha[s] wronged, and so forth. Taking personal responsi-
74 See id. at 176 (discussing Tradition Ten and A.A.'s reluctance to take stances on
outside issues).
75 See id. at 176-77.
71 See Kurtz, supra note 38, at 98 (explaining that the term "sobriety" is commonly
misunderstood in the twelve-step context).
" See KATZ, supra note 33, at 20 (stating that membership in a twelve-step
program can be a lifelong commitment).
' See Kurtz, supra note 38, at 98 (describing the continuous nature of the
"healing" process).
79 See KATZ, supra note 33, at 20 (stating that there is no known average length of
membership in twelve-step programs).
' See id. (describing the reality that people who drop out of A.A. often return to
the group when they need it).
8" The Oxford Group was an evangelical Christian group. Many alcoholics,
including Bill Wilson, founder of A.A., had been attending Oxford Group meetings
with the hope of resolving their alcoholism through spiritual healing. But in 1937,
Wilson, along with other alcoholics, split from the Oxford Group and formed a group
aimed solely at helping recovering alcoholics. The group later became A.A. See
Kurtz, supra note 38, at 94-95.
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bility in such ways has a long history in the Christian tradition of
confession, and self-disclosure in self-help groups does have a
confessional aspect.
" 12
Twelve-step programs have been successful for many people
seeking to deal with their obsessions. A.A. and other programs,
however, are not without their critics. For many, A.A.'s religious
orientation is alienating. Some medical professionals have criticized
A.A. "as being cultlike and unscientific and as having a middle-class
white male bias.""3 This criticism could stem partially from the
fact that many professionals are displeased with A.A.'s refusal to
allow professionals to lead twelve-step programs. 4 Despite the
criticism, twelve-step programs have helped thousands to deal with
their addictions and do serve as an important outlet for many down-
and-out individuals.85 Many of those people who have been helped
see no other way of remaining "clean." One member of N.A. who
had passed through a number of detoxification rehabilitation
centers said: "'It is the only way I found that works.'"
86
2. Non-Twelve-Step Programs
As A.A. developed, other self-help groups formed to meet
various needs. These new, largely parent-organized groups banded
together to publicize the problems with which they dealt, to demand
that professionals pay more attention to their problems, and to
influence government spending and policy.87 The Association for
Retarded Children is just one example of the myriad of groups that
formed in the 1950s and 1960s.8" Although non-twelve-step groups
'2 KATZ, supra note 33, at 27.
s Kurtz, supra note 38, at 116.
s Tradition Two states that there is no leader other than the Higher Power, and
Tradition Eight requires that A.A. remain free from professional influence. See
TWELVE STEPS, supra note 12, at 132, 166. A.A., however, does not disparage
professionals. Quite to the contrary, 56% of members of A.A. do receive some sort
of outside assistance with their addiction. See ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS WORLD
SERVS., INC., supra note 43.
' Concerned academics have argued that twelve-step programs have not
empirically been proven effective, and that the blind acceptance of the twelve-step
strategy coupled with a failure to search for alternative treatment is problematic.
A.A. has been evaluated extensively and, although outcomes from the studies conflict,
the general consensus is that A.A. offers an effective method of recovery for those
who continue beyond a few meetings. See Kurtz, supra note 38, at 107-08.
"Bohlen, supra note 24, at 34.
8 See KATZ, supra note 33, at 14.
s Other groups that were formed later include Parents for Parents, designed to
help parents cope with their child's illness, and SHARE, a support group for women
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have been created for many similar reasons and share many features
with twelve-step groups, non-twelve-step programs differ in some
significant ways. The most prominent difference between the two
methodologies is that the non-twelve-step paradigm does not have
an underlying spiritual ideology.8g The twelve-step groups, unlike
the non-twelve-step groups, have a very rigid step-by-step plan on
how to treat addictions and compulsions; non-twelve-step groups
reject such rigidity. The twelve-step program structure takes its
form from its spiritual underpinnings. 90 Non-twelve-step pro-
grams, by contrast, are often less structured91 and do not neces-
sarily have a prescribed strategy towards "growth."
92
Non-twelve-step programs do not require any admission of
powerlessness. Indeed, many groups actively reject such a notion
as defeatist.98 Instead, non-twelve-step self-help groups emphasize
"learning and sharing coping skills through group process, mutual
support, practical information and advice, role examples, and so
forth."94
The amount of time a member spends in a non-twelve-step self-
help group is often short since her involvement with the group is
temporary. Once her crisis is resolved, that member leaves the
group. Unlike A.A. or other twelve-step programs, there is no
with breast cancer. See id. at 14-15.
89 See id. at 19.
90 Recall, for example, that A.A. begins each meeting with a recitation of the
Serenity Prayer. See supra note 66 and accompanying text; see also supra note 81
and accompanying text (discussing the Protestant origins of A.A.).
91 Without the religious background to center the organization, non-twelve-step
groups use other means of unifying in order to achieve their end goals. Act-Up and
the Association for Retarded Children, for example, use politics as a center around
which to structure their groups; however, differences in political ideologies require
flexibility, thus contributing to less structure in non-twelve-step groups. See KATZ,
supra note 33, at 19-21 (describing the "free-wheeling discussion and interchanges"
that occur in the non-twelve-step setting).
' See id. at 19 (stating that non-twelve-step groups are usually nonideological
and further explicating that "non-12-step groups do not include a more or less
prescribed meeting structure: they do not normally expect their members to pursue
a phased path of personal growth and change"); see also KATZ & BENDER, THE
STRENGTH IN Us, supra note 34, at 120-21 (contrasting "highly ideologized
organizations... [with] those which do not have such a strong set of enforced beliefs
and procedures" and concluding that "the style of the latter type of organization is
freer and more -open to individual variation and influence than the A.A. type").
9' See KATZ, supra note 33, at 19-20 (stating that "[s]ome non-12-step groups are
concerned that accepting the idea of powerlessness" could be inhibiting and may
ultimately prevent people from "gain[ing] greater control over their own bodies and
therefore over their day-to-day living").
4Id. at 19.
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stigma attached to moving on from the group; non-twelve-step
members are expected to make it on their own.95
Non-twelve-step programs are often led by professional counsel-
ors or leaders.9 6 Nonetheless, group therapy sessions may be
termed "self-help" despite the presence of a professional since
members of the group need the presence of their peers to help
them deal with their own problems.
Sociopolitical action is an important part of the non-twelve-step
group. This is because non-twelve-step groups, like professional
therapy, focus more on the underlying cause of the problem, rather
than the problem itself, Groups that do not espouse the twelve-
step paradigm are often organized as lobbying organizations or
political action groups. Often, they will support political candidates
or specific legislation.9 By contrast, twelve-step programs avoid
publicity.
10 0
Although both twelve-step groups and non-twelve-step groups
can fit into any one of Levy's four-part "primary focus" typol-
ogy, 1° 1 twelve-step groups tend to be Type I groups, striving to
modify behaviors, not merely to socialize or support their members.
Non-twelve-step groups focus on the "bigger picture" and help
members look at what might be causing the problematic behavior.
Twelve-step groups do not provide that same level of support; they
focus singularly on treatment of the addiction, without attempting
to address the underlying causes.
10 2
95 For example, a person in Parents Without Partners may join the group after
recently divorcing. She may need to make new divorced friends, to discuss feelings
of rejection and fears about being a single parent. After a few months, the parent has
usually adjusted to the single life. The group may not be needed any longer, and the
group is happy for that person, because she has learned to cope with the underlying
stress. See id. at 20.
' See Alan Gartner & Frank Riessman, Introduction to THE SELF-HELP
REVOLUrION 17, 22 (Alan Gartner & Frank Riessman eds., 1984) (discussing how,
although many self-help groups, including A.A. and its offshoots, are antagonistic to
professionals, most self-help groups involve professional participation).
' See KATZ, supra note 33, at 20-21 (describing the differences between twelve-
step and non-twelve-step groups relating to their opinions on outside issues).
98 See REMINE ET AL., supra note 40, at 15 (stating that therapy might explore
"deep seated issues").
" See KATZ, supra note 33, at 19-21.
10' See supra notes 12, 65 (explaining Tradition Ten). For a more detailed
discussion of the differences between the two methodologies, see KATZ, supra note
33, at 19-21.
... See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
1o2 See POWELL, supra note 42, at 158 (describing the "highly singular purpose" of
N.A. by quoting a brochure that states, "Narcotics Anonymous does not ... provide
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Different self-help groups are designed to serve different needs.
Despite their varying methodologies and goals, some significant
overlap exists among self-help groups generally. Self-help groups
rely on the group dynamic to help members improve self-esteem
and overcome feelings of isolation, loneliness, and victimization.
The groups support their members' changes in attitude, behavior,
and role in society. This growth contributes to the development of
an improved self or to the formation of a mechanism to cope with
a society unsympathetic to certain behaviors, beliefs, or life-
styles.1 0 3 These groups provide continuing acceptance, tolerance,
and support even if the behaviors described are shameful or
abhorrent. 104
C. The Importance of Confidentiality
Within the Self-Help Setting
Anonymity and confidentiality are vital to the functioning of
certain self-help groups.10 5  For example, because only about
twenty members attend a typical G.A. meeting:
People notice newcomers right away, ask them how they got there,
and tell them that they do not have to speak if they do not want
to. A chairperson calls the meeting to order and says, "Anything
said in the room stays in the room." New members are intro-
duced. Members are asked, in turn, to read from the meeting
booklet. The chairperson then begins the meeting asking for
"therapy."
Therapy frequently proceeds according to the following
formula: "I am [Joe or Joan].10 6 I am a compulsive gambler."
The person then says how long it has been since he or she made
the last bet and tells the story of how gambling interfered with his
or her past life (for example, "I lied to my wife and my kids. I
marriage, family or vocational counseling" (alteration in original)).
' See generally KATZ, supra note 33, at 24-28 (noting that self-help groups provide
their members with emotional support and the opportunity to learn adaptive skills
that can help them cope with their problems and deficiencies).
See id. (describing the function of self-help group support).
105 See supra note 65 (reciting Traditions Eleven and Twelve which describe the
importance of anonymity in the A.A. context). This Comment advocates giving a
privilege to certain self-help groups. Not all self-help groups require a privilege in
order to function. For a discussion of how to determine which groups should be
accorded a privilege, see infra part IV.A.
106 Last names are not used in order to preserve confidentiality. See KATz, supra
note 33, at 27 (explaining that confidentiality is symbolized by the word "anonymous"
in the group's name and by identifying members only by their first names).
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stole from my boss. When I came into the room, I owed every-
body. I was on the verge of suicide"). The person ends by telling
how things are different since he or she joined GA .... 107
The information disclosed at self-help group meetings is highly
personal in nature.' People are willing to share their experi-
ences in order to overcome their problems and help others.
0 9
However, in order for these types of programs to function,
anonymity and confidentiality are crucial. Every meeting for A.A.,
G.A., and N.A. begins with the chairperson's statement that what is
discussed in the room should never be revealed outside of it."0
At meetings, members stand up and speak, but reveal only their first
names;"' moreover, once they leave, they rarely disclose their
status as members."2 At G.A., this confidentiality is especially
important, because many compulsive gamblers have lied to family
and friends about "finances and financially related illegal
activities, such as check forgery, fraud, and theft and embezzlement
at the workplace.""' Discussion of these illegal activities is an
important part of treatment." 4 The expectation, or even mere
possibility, that the information could be introduced against them
in a court of law would inhibit open discussion. Although the
example is especially clear in the G.A. context, the same holds true
for many other treatment programs. To support their habit,
alcoholics steal, drive drunk, assault people, and sometimes even kill
107 Henry R. Lesieur, Working with and Understanding Gamblers Anonymous, in
WORKING WITH SELF-HELP, supra note 33, at 237,238 (alteration in original) (footnote
added).
o See, e.g., KATZ, supra note 33, at 27 (stating that "[m]embers disclose to other
members very personal experiences, thoughts, emotions, or fantasies that they
normally would not reveal to other people").
'" See Borkman, supra note 48, at 23-24 (stating that one of the hallmarks of a
self-help group is the telling of individual stories which enables members to share
their strengths and hopes with each other, thus helping them to overcome their
difficulties).
"' See KATZ, supra note 33, at 27 (describing the "compact of confidentiality").
... See supra note 105.
1
2 See Breslin, supra note 1, at A2 (stating that members seldom reveal their A.A.
membership status to the outside world); see also KATZ, supra note 33, at 27 (stating
that personal revelation in the self-help setting is bolstered by the anonymity feature
of these groups).
"s Lesieur, supra note 107, at 243 (emphasis added).
IN See e.g., KATz, supra note 33, at 27 (stating that mutual support and aid in the
face of shocking and shameful revelations are key features of support groups);
TWELVE STEPS, supra note 12, at 55 (describing Step Five which requires alcoholics to
admit "to G[-]d, to ourselves, and to another human being the exact nature of our
wrongs").
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in bouts of alcoholic rage. 15  Drug addicts illegally possess and
use drugs. Funding the habit can be very costly, leading people to
beg, borrow, and steal. The efficacy of self-help groups would
undoubtedly be diminished if members' disclosures were made pub-
lic.
11 6
No empirical studies assessing the importance of confidentiality
within the strictly nonprofessional self-help setting have been
conducted. Numerous studies, however, have been conducted in
the individual therapy and group therapy contexts. For example,
Ralph Slovenko," 7 while conducting a discussion with members
of a psychotherapy group, became keenly aware of the extent to
which patients valued confidentiality. Most members of a group
therapy session stated that they would refuse to testify, or would try
to find some legal loophole that would enable them not to testify,
about disclosures made to them by other members. 118  One
115 See e.g., supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text (discussing the Cox case).
116 See infra notes 118-22 and accompanying text (surveying various studies which
find that lack of confidentiality in therapy has a negative effect on participants'
willingness to disclose information).
11 Ralph Slovenko is a psychiatrist, professor, and author of numerous works and
studies on confidentiality in the therapeutic context.
"' See Ralph Slovenko, Group Psychotherapy: Privileged Communication and
Confidentiality, 5 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 405, 405 (1977). Professor Slovenko talked
with members of a group therapy session in Grosse Pointe Park, Michigan. In
meeting with them, he asked them about the importance of confidentiality. All
members expressed their belief that everything that was revealed in the therapy
session was held in confidence among members. Professor Slovenko asked the group
how they would react if a group member admitted to killing someone. One woman
responded that she "would think the responsibility would be for the therapist to do
what she thought was necessary. I wouldn't feel that I was responsible." Id. at 444.
When asked what they would do if called to testify against one another, one man
responded: "For any group to function they must do so with trust and confidence in
what the members say. Therefore I would not say anything. I would try not to
answer any questions." Id. at 450. That same man suggested raising competency
issues, hearsay exceptions, and the Fifth Amendment as potential ways of precluding
his testimony. A different man stated:
I might be closer to W-3 [a female member of the group] than to my own
wife in some ways. Here it is possible for me to go very, very deep and have
a very deep attachment and relationship with this woman who is not my wife
.... I therefore wouldn't be competent to testify against her.
Id. at 450-51. When Slovenko explained that a spousal privilege exists for husbands
and wives but not for members of self-help groups, one woman stated: "I would tell
them to go to hell. I would not testify against anyone in here. I wouldn't care if I
was mad at them or not. I just wouldn't do it." Id. at 451. Although this
experiment was conducted in a professional group therapy context, similar issues and
feelings arise in the self-help context. There is a clear expectation, stated at the
beginning of every meeting, that "what is said in the room remains in the room." See
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member stated, "I would feel as with anything else brought up here,
that it is confidential within the group. The main thing for us is to
feel free to express ourselves and have confidence in each other to
do that."" 9 Although not dispositive, the various studies indicate
that potential candidates for therapy and current therapy patients
would be substantially less inclined to reveal certain aspects about
themselves, particularly those with legal ramifications, if confidenti-
ality could not be guaranteed.
12 0
Another empirical study, conducted in Texas, ascertained the
importance of confidentiality and privilege between therapists and
their patients. The study, conducted after Texas passed a psycho-
therapist-patient privilege, revealed some pertinent conclusions.
The study indicated that patients do not rely directly on privilege
laws in deciding whether to seek psychotherapy or make disclosures.
They do, however, rely on the therapist's ethical "promise" to
19 Slovenko, supra note 118, at 444-45.
l See Robert G. Meyer & Steven R. Smith, A Crisis in Group Therapy, 32 AM.
PSYCHOL. 638, 639-40 (1977) (finding that 81.8% of respondents to a questionnaire
on confidentiality indicated that they would refuse to enter group therapy or would
be substantially less inclined to speak freely without the assurance of confidentiality);
Daniel W. Shuman & Myron S. Weiner, The Privilege Study: An Empirical Examination
of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 60 N.C. L. REV. 893, 916, 919-20, 929 (1982)
(showing that although people indicated no greater willingness to talk when they
knew confidentiality was assured, they did indicate dramatically reduced willingness
to talk about sensitive subjects with legal consequences once told that no legal
privilege existed); Deborah E. Willage & Robert G. Meyer, The Effects of VaiyingLevels
of Confidentiality on Self-Disclosure, 2 GROUP 88, 94-95 (1978) (finding that subjects
were more open in answering personality inventories when confidentiality was assured
than when they thought the results of the survey might be released); Note, Functional
Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Implications for the Privileged
Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226, 1262 (1962) [hereinafter Note, Functional
Overlap] (suggesting that many people are unaware of current privilege law but that
a substantial number of people felt that they would be much less willing to disclose
personal information in therapy if they knew that a psychotherapist was legally
obligated to release information learned during a therapy session); Note, Where the
Public Peril Begins: A Survey of Psychotherapists to Determine the Effects of Tarasoff, 31
STAN. L. REV. 165, 183 (1978) (noting that one quarter of therapists found that
patients were reluctant to discuss violent tendencies when patients were informed of
the possibility of the breach of the confidence); see also David J. Miller & Mark H.
Thelen, Knowledge and Beliefs About Confidentiality in Psychotherapy, 17 PROF. PSYCHOL.:
RES. & PRAC. 15, 18 (1986) (finding that 42% of the study's subjects maintained that
if they were told that the information they revealed was not kept completely
confidential, they would exhibit reluctance and discretion before speaking to a
therapist); Howard B. Roback et al., Guarding Confidentiality in Clinical Groups: The
Therapist's Dilemma, 42 INT'LJ. GROUP PSYCHOTHERAPY 81, 81 (1992) (indicating that
therapists who had not discussed confidentiality with their patients were likely to view
such discussions as having an inhibiting effect on group process).
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remain silent regarding their disclosures.' 2 ' Therefore, "if as a
result of a change in the law, therapists did disclose some confiden-
tial information, and if many actual or potential patients learned of
these disclosures, people might indeed be deterred from confiding
in psychotherapists."122 Although this study may not be generaliz-
able to the self-help context, there is no reason to assume that
members would act any differently if their confidences were
revealed by fellow members rather than by a professional. The
member is concerned with confidentiality, after all, not with who is
making the disclosure.
The data derived from these studies are difficult to evaluate.
123
Nevertheless, the studies support the common sense notion that
people, though unaware of their legal rights, expect confidentiality
from their therapists and their peers in group therapy. Members
are unconcerned with how or why the confidentiality is maintained,
but deem it essential in order to assure free disclosure and proper
group functioning.
II. THE THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE: WHAT IS
PRIVILEGED AND WHY?
The law generally favors disclosure of all relevant and material
information. 14  However, because certain relationships have his-
121 See Robert Weisberg & Michael Wald, Confidentiality Laws and State Efforts to
Protect Abused or Neglected Children: The Need for Statutory Reform, in PSYCHOTHERAPY
AND THE LAw 157, 193 (Louis Everstine & Diana S. Everstine eds., 1986) (stating that
patients rely on ethical conduct and not privilege law for assurances of confidenti-
ality).
" Id. The Texas study was conducted by a lawyer and a psychiatrist. It was
distributed to therapists, psychotherapy patients, judges, and a random group of
university students who could represent potential psychotherapy patients in the state.
Interestingly, the psychotherapists themselves revealed that they were ignorant as to
the status of confidentiality and privilege under Texas law. Instead of focusing on
legal issues, most patients seemed certain that therapists would not reveal confidences
because of their personal ethics. See id. Similarly, members of a self-help group
expect that the moral promise not to reveal what occurs at a meeting will prevent
disclosure of any statements revealed regarding anything ranging from thoughts and
feelings to illegal acts. See Slovenko, supra note 118, at 450 (quoting group members'
observations about revealing information that is stated with the expectation of
confidentiality).
12 Many of the samples were not representative. Most subjects were college
students, who are generally more aware of their rights, and of the legal system and
who might not represent the average potential member of group therapy.
12
4 SeeJAM5S B. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON
LAW 264-65 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1896) (stating that evidentiary laws
presuppose the admission of all relevant evidence). Therefore, courts consistently
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torically been highly valued in our society, the courts and legisla-
tures have been willing to make certain exceptions to protect the
sanctity of those relationships. 12' Thus, it is useful to consult court
decisions and statutory law to understand when and why a privilege
has been recognized. According to Federal Rule of Evidence
501,126 the federal courts may develop privilege doctrine by
applying the common law "in light of reason and experience."
127
Congress approved Rule 501 with the intention of allowing federal
and state courts to develop the privilege laws on a case-by-case
basis.
128
recognize that privileges are an exception to the presumption of disclosure. See, e.g.,
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) ("Whatever their origins, these
exceptions [privileges not to testify in court] to the demands for every man's evidence
are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the
search for truth.").
I2 See GREEN & NEssON, supra note 29, at 689-90 (discussing rationales for
privilege law); see also Hoffman, supra note 11, atAl (noting that the principle behind
privilege law is the protection of certain relationships).
" Rule 501 provides:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or
provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, govern-
ment, state, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of
the United States in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil
actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense
as to which state law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness,
person, government, state, or political subdivision thereof shall be
determined in accordance with state law.
FED. R. EVID. 501.
Id. Prior to the enactment of Rule 501, there was terrible confusion regarding
whether federal courts should promulgate their own rules of evidence or follow state
law. See Rules of Evidence: Hearings on H.R. 5463 Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciaty, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3 (1974) [hereinafter Hearings]. As a result, the
Supreme Court, acting pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988),
promulgated the Federal Rules of Evidence on November 20, 1972, and submitted
them to Congress on February 5, 1973. See id. at 5.
" Before approving the rules, Congress deleted nine nonconstitutionally required
(but not unconstitutional) privileges proposed by the Court and instead chose to
maintain the status quo. See Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 502-510, 56 F.R.D. 183, 234-56
(1972). The proposed rules would have created specific privileges for communica-
tions made in the context of certain activities or relationships, including. required
reports, lawyer-client, psychotherapist-patient, husband-wife, priest-penitent, political
vote, trade secrets, secrets of state, and identity of informers. Since Congress could
not agree to pass all of the proposed privileges, and the disagreement threatened to
prevent acceptance of the entire Rules package, Congress adopted Rule 501. See S.
REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051,
7053. The action of Congress in approving this general rule on privileges should not
be understood as a categorical disapproval of the aforementioned proposed statutory
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A. The Rationales Behind Privilege Law
There are various rationales espoused for determining when and
how a privilege is obtained. This Comment identifies three
rationales, namely the utilitarian, privacy, and functionalist
rationales, 2 9 and discusses how each has been applied to justify
privileges that are accepted as part of modern jurisprudence.
1. The Utilitarian Approach
"The utilitarian approach theorizes that the protection of
confidentiality is justified because the benefits to society are greater
than the costs associated with confidentiality."," In determining
whether a relationship ought to be deemed privileged, rather than
merely confidential,3 1 John Henry Wigmore posits four condi-
privileges. Rather, Congress's "action should be understood as reflecting the view
that the recognition of a privilege based on a confidential relationship and other
privileges should be determined on a case-by-case basis." Id. at 11, reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7059.
" A fourth justification, the power rationale, also exists. Some argue that the
reason certain privileges exist in our society is because a power elite has determined
that the relationships in which they participate are worthy of special protection. See
GREEN & NESSON, supra note 29, at 696; 23 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W.
GRAHAM, EVIDENCE § 5422, at 673-79 (1980). For example, doctors, lawyers and
religious leaders all hold a great deal of power within modern day political structures.
As a result, they enjoy certain benefits that are not granted to all people. The choice
of the word "privilege" connotes the essence of this rationale. See 23 id. at 675-76.
Although the power theory has some merit, it does not justify privileges or
suggest a means for determining when privileges should be granted. Instead, the
power theory articulates why any privileges exist when privileges impede thejudicial
process. See Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 HARv. L. REV.
1450, 1493 (1985) [hereinafter Developments] (explaining that the power rationale
provides merely a theory, and not ajustification, as to why so few privileges exist).
Nor does the rationale explain why teachers, social workers, and rape crisis
counselors, three groups that are traditionally comprised of minorities and women,
have been recently extended privileges in many states. SeeJ. Alexander Tanford &
AnthonyJ. Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U. PA. L.
REV. 544,592 (1980) (indicating that all but five states have passed some form of rape
shield law). Furthermore, the theory does not provide any sort of test for creating
new privileges. Because the power rationale does not enjoy widespread support, it
will not be discussed further in this Comment. For a more complete description of
the Power Theory, see 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra, § 5422, at 673-79.
'" Steven R. Smith, Medical and Psychotherapy Privileges and Confidentiality: On
Giving with One Hand and Removing with the Other, 75 KY. L.J. 473, 477 (1987)
(discussing the utilitarian rationale and the Wigmore criteria as applied to both a class
of communications and an individual).
' See supra note 27 (explaining the difference between confidentiality and
privilege).
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tions. These four conditions comprise the "utilitarian" approach,
because they are designed to determine the utility of providing a
privilege in light of the importance of the truth-finding function of
the court. 3 2 Wigmore's principles have been cited by other legal
authorities and currently enjoy widespread judicial support as the
sine qua non of determining whether a privilege should obtain.
33
Wigmore's criteria are:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they
will not be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the commu-
nity ought to be sedulouslyfostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of
the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained
for the correct disposal of litigation.
13 4
2. The Privacy Rationale
A second approach to justifying certain privileges has been to
invoke the constitutionally recognized right to privacy.13 1 "This
M The utilitarian rationale has been used tojustify various privileges, including
the attorney-client, husband-wife, priest-penitent, and doctor-patient privileges. See
infra part II.B; see also 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW
§ 2332, at 642 (John T. McNaughton ed., rev. ed. 1961) (discussing the spousal
privilege); 8 id. § 2396, at 878 (justifying a priest-penitent privilege); 8 id. § 2380a,
at 829-30 (opposing a doctor-patient privilege because of the relationship's failure to
meet all four prongs of the test). But see Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51
(1980) ("[T]he physician must know all that a patient can articulate in order to
identify and to treat disease; barriers to full disclosure would impair diagnosis and
treatment.").
133 See CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 72, at 171 (Edward
W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984). Most courts considering testimonial privileges have
relied extensively on Wigmore's test. See, e.g., In re Doe, 711 F.2d 1187, 1193 (2d
Cir. 1983) (applying the Wigmore test and rejecting the proposed psychotherapist-
patient privilege); Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1100-03 (5th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971) (applying Wigmore's criteria to recognize a qualified
attorney-client privilege for a corporate client).
'34 8 WIGMORE, supra note 132, § 2285, at 527.
"5 The right to privacy may be characterized as the
right of the individual to be free in his private affairs from governmental
surveillance and intrusion[,] ... the right of an individual not to have his
private affairs made public by the government[,] ... [and t]he right of an
individual to be free in action, thought, experience, and belief from
governmental compulsion.
Deborah A. Ausburn, Note, Circling the Wagons: Informational Privacy and Family
Testimonial Privileges, 20 GA. L. REV. 173, 200 n.106 (1985) (quoting Phillip B.
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is a conception of privacy that stands apart both from the calculat-
ing Hobbesian self and from calculating utilitarian society."1 36
The protection of privacy through the grant of a testimonial
privilege is not meant as a means of assuring competent treatment,
but rather as an end in itself. Privacy proponents argue that
Wigmore's analysis overlooks important human values such as
privacy, dignity, intimacy, anonymity, and individuality:
13 7
Privacy permits people to share intimacies and ideas upon their
own terms, and thus to establish those mutual reciprocal relin-
quishments of the self that underlie the relations of love, friend-
ship, and trust .... The ability to shield ourselves from public view
permits the exchange of intimate confidences necessary to
establish a secure love or trust.
38
Preserving some degree of privacy in certain relationships in order
to protect these values is as significant as, and perhaps more
significant than, appropriate fact-finding in litigation. Therefore,
a privilege should be accorded to these relationships.
13 9
Kurland, The Private I: Some Reflections on Privacy and the Constitution, U. CHI. MAC.,
Autumn 1976, at 7, 8). The constitutionally recognized right to privacy includes due
process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as the Fourth
Amendment protection against illegal searches and seizures. See U.S. CONST. amends.
IV, V, XIV. The Supreme Court has crafted the right to privacy in numerous cases.
See e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567-68 (1969) (concluding that the right to
privacy includes the right to receive information and ideas regardless of their social
worth); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (concluding that
prohibiting the use of contraception unconstitutionally infringes on the right to
marital privacy); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (describing the Fourth Amendment right to privacy as protecting the
"right to be let alone"). See generally Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV.
L. REV. 737 (1989) (summarizing the development of the right to privacy doctrine).
" Sanford Levinson, Testimonial Privileges and the Preferences of Friendship, 1984
DUKE L.J. 631, 643 (arguing for a "privilege-ticket" in which thereby enabling each
person could choose which of her communications should be privileged).
13
7 See GREEN & NESSON, supra note 29, at 692.
" Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Interpersonal Testimonial Privileges Under the Federal
Rules of Evidence: A Suggested Approach, 64 GEo. L.J. 613, 651 (1976).
"' Although many courts have been reluctant tojustify testimonial privileges on
the basis of the right to privacy, some courts have done so. See, e.g., In re Zuniga, 714
F.2d 632, 640-42 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983 (1984) (noting the
existence of a constitutional right to privacy in the psychologist-patient relationship,
but stating that it was not absolute and would not protect certain information such
as patient identity, dates of treatment, and length of treatment); Caesar v. Mountanos,
542 F.2d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977) (stating that the
psychotherapist-patient privilege can be justified under the constitutional right to
privacy); Roberts v. Superior Court, 508 P.2d 309, 313 (Cal. 1973) (holding that the
psychotherapist-patient privilege should be broadly construed in light of the
constitutional right to privacy); In re Lifschutz, 467 P.2d 557, 567 (Cal. 1970) (holding
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In Griswold v. Connecticut,14  the Supreme Court struck
down a statute prohibiting the use of contraception as an unconsti-
tutional invasion of this right to privacy.141 Certain relationships,
by virtue of their depth and intimacy, fall within constitutionally
delineated zones of privacy, and therefore merit special protection
and should be accorded a privilege.,4 2  The Supreme Court
extended the right to privacy to information in Whalen v. Roe.
143
In Whalen, the Court considered a state law requiring physicians to
disclose the names of patients to whom they had prescribed
dangerous drugs. A group of patients and doctors challenged the
statute because they believed it would discourage patients from
seeking necessary medical care for fear of negative reputational
repercussions. 44 The Court refused to extend a privilege to the
specific information requested in the case.145  Nevertheless, the
Court seized Whalen as an opportunity to redefine and clarify the
right to privacy, and asserted that the right to privacy did encom-
pass the "individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters" as well as a second interest in making certain kinds of
fundamental decisions.
146
Analysis under the privacy rationale raises many difficulties,
especially in light of the Court's recent reluctance to expand
individual rights under due process, Fourth Amendment, and
general privacy rationales. 47  Still, the privacy interest has been
that a patient's right to confidentiality with his psychotherapist is protected by the
zone of privacy created in Griswold); In re "B", 394 A.2d 419, 424-26 (Pa. 1978)
(holding, in a child custody dispute based on the privacy right embodied in the
Pennsylvania Constitution and United States Constitution, that a doctor would not
be held in contempt of court for refusing to release a patient's psychiatric records).
140 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
141 See id. at 485-86.
142 See David W. Louisell & Kent SinclairJr., The Supreme Court of California 1969-
1970, Foreword: Reflections on the Law of Privileged Communications-the Psychotherapist-
Patient Privilege in Perspective, 59 CAL. L. REv. 30, 41-42 (1971) (discussing how the
court in In re Lifichutz believed that the confidentiality of a psychotherapeutic
relationship falls within a zone of privacy protected by the Constitution, not merely
the state evidence code).
143 429 U.S. 589,599-600 (1977) (stating that the two-pronged constitutional right
to privacy protects the right of an individual not to have her private affairs made
public by the government and to be free from governmental compulsion with regard
to decision-making).
'4 See id. at 600.
'45 See id. at 603-04.
146 1d. at 599.
147 See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989) (stating that liberty
interests must be fundamental and traditional to be protected by the right to privacy);
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invoked as a justification for various legal interests, and should be
accorded weight in the context of testimonial privileges as well. 48
3. The Functionalist Rationale
Functionalists maintain that privilege law, if it is to be consis-
tent, must accord similar protections to relationships that are
functionally alike. 149  "Principally, functional arguments attack
normative distinctions made between functionally similar relations.
The success of this type of argument depends upon persuading the
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-96 (1986) (refusing to accord a privacy right
to protect homosexual sodomy); In re Search Warrant (Sealed), 810 F.2d 67, 71-73 (3d
Cir.) (employing a balancing test and concluding that the seizure of medical records
pursuant to a warrant that offered confidentiality protections constituted a valid
intrusion and was not a violation of Whalen privacy), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1007
(1987); J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080 (6th Cir. 1981) (holding that although the
Supreme Court recognizes a right to privacy, such a right does not extend to "the
general right to nondisclosure of personal information"). The Fourth Amendment
privacy component is distinct from Griswold and its progeny and from the Whalen
two-pronged right to privacy which relied on due process rights. The Court has been
trying to narrow Fourth Amendment privacy as well as due process and informational
privacy. See e.g., Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451-53 (1990)
(concluding that the degree of subjective intrusion imposed by checkpoints on
motorists is minimal); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,
671-72 (1989) (stating that the nature of public employment may lessen expectations
of privacy). The Court embraced "the right to be let alone" as the dominant principle
of the Fourth Amendment. This made privacy the dispositive factor of how and when
the amendment would be applied. See Scott E. Sundby, "Evetyman" s Fourth
Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 1751, 1757-63 (1994) (describing the demise of individual rights and differentiat-
ing between Fourth Amendment privacy and due process privacy). Nonetheless, the
privacy rationale still presents a compelling argument for privilege law. Although
privacy doctrine is constantly fluctuating, it consistently protects and encourages the
development and maintenance of important relationships.
"' The "right to be let alone" and the right to a degree of intimacy in certain
relationships are rights encompassed within the right to privacy. Privacy, therefore,
provides a compellingjustification for according a testimonial privilege to relation-
ships that fall within the zone the Court has delineated as private. For a more
extensive discussion of the privacy rationale, see Thomas G. Krattenmaker,
Testimonial Privileges in Federal Courts: An Alternative to the Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence, 62 GEO. L.J. 61, 85-94 (1973) (analyzing the argument that testimonial
privileges serve to protect important individual privacy interests); David W. Louisell,
Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 TUL. L.
REV. 101, 110-15 (1956) (discussing privileges rooted in common law and stating that
privacy is necessary to preserve these relationships); Louisell & Sinclair, supra note
142, at 51-53 (critiquing and defending the psychotherapist-patient privilege as falling
under the zone of privacy protected by the Constitution).
'49 See Note, Functional Overlap, supra note 120, at 1234-46 (explaining that an
attorney assumes many functions and arguing for an attorney-client privilege from a
functionalist perspective).
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legal decision-maker to adopt a social vision that makes the norma-
tive distinction appear arbitrary and unfair."15 The functionalist
rationale cuts across lines of professional orientation and protects
only the function, not the profession itself. 5 '
Determining what functions deserve protection rests in part on
an assessment of societal values and priorities. If society has chosen
to protect certain functions, then fairness requires that all people
performing that function ought to be afforded the same privileges
that attach to it. For example, a spouse is someone with whom one
shares love, for whom one will care, and in whom one will confide
and trust. In fact, however, most family members serve a similar
function. Parents and children, as well as siblings, also provide each
other with love, care, and trust. Thus, to the extent the parent-child
or sibling relationship is analogous to the spousal bond,
functionalists have argued for a privilege protecting all family
members rather than just one's spouse.
152
Similarly, communications between professionals who provide
"treatment" and their clients or patients have historically been privi-
leged. When a person goes to an attorney, the attorney-client
communications are made in the context of seeking a "cure" for the
problem, in the form of legal assistance. Likewise, a person goes to
a clergyman to find spiritual "healing," to a doctor for medical
"assistance," and to a psychotherapist for mental-health "treatment."
Communications for which protection is sought must relate to the
necessary treatment of a type of ailment, dilemma, or addiction.
Social workers and counselors perform a treatment role that is
functionally indistinguishable from those played by professionals
already enjoying a legal privilege. 5 Thus, extending the privilege
'oDevelopments, supra note 129, at 1491.
5 See Robert M. Fisher, The Psychotherapeutic Professions and the Law of Privileged
Communications, 10 WAYNE L. REv. 609, 612 (1964) (advocating the creation of a
privilege to protect specific functions within a relationship rather than to protect a
profession).
152 See e.g., In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1325 (D. Nev. 1983) (arguing that
there is no rational reason for distinguishing the marital relation from the parent-
child relation);see also Ausburn,supra note 135, at 195-200 (presenting arguments for
family testimonial privileges).
M See e.g., Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411, 425-26 (Alaska 1976) (Rabinowitz, J.,
concurring) (focusing on the function of therapy in determining whether to grant a
privilege to counselors and stating that "[i]t is not necessarily relationships with
psychiatrists or licensed psychologists that ought to be sedulously fostered; rather,
what should be fostered is the therapeutic relationship which looks toward
improvement of mental health").
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to these groups is both proper and consistent in light of society's
recognition of their importance and their functional similarity to
doctors, attorneys, clergymembers, and others who already enjoy
legally privileged communications.
154
B. Currently Recognized Evidentiary Privileges
and Their Supporting Rationales
Having discussed the underlying rationales for granting a
privilege, it is useful to understand how these rationales are applied
in practice. Thus, this section will discuss some of the more widely
accepted evidentiary privileges and their underlying rationales.
1. Attorney-Client Privilege
"Confidentiality between lawyer and client is a privilege estab-
lished in legal history, written in the code of professional responsi-
bility for the American Bar Association and adopted as law in 48
of the 50 states. The oath of admission to the bar-proposed by
the ABA and adopted in many states-requires lawyers to 'solemnly
swear' that 'I will maintain the confidence and preserve inviolate
the secrets of my client.' Violation of the oath can lead to
disbarment."'
1"4 Critics of the functionalist perspective argue that almost any relationship could
be included in this rationale. They contend that the privilege is overbroad. When
one speaks to a friend, for example, one is seeking "counseling." However, a
distinction may be drawn between friends and counselors. When one turns to a
friend, one is not seeking the assistance of the friend qua counselor; one is seeking
the support of a friend qua friend. This distinction is crucial. The protected function
is the counseling function-the treatment-not merely support or advice one derives
from a listening friend. Furthermore, the friendship can serve its function even
without complete disclosure, whereas relationships for which treatment is the primary
function require unfettered disclosure in order to serve their intended purpose.
In any case, this Comment advocates extension of a privilege only to groups that
merit such status under all three rationales. This limitation mitigates against the
overbreadth weakness of the functionalist rationale and responds to the slippery-slope
concern. See infra notes 302-03 and accompanying text (addressing the counter-
argument that extending the privilege to self-help groups would create a slippery.
slope). For a more complete discussion of the functionalist rationale, see Fisher,
supra note 151, at 637-41 (discussing how present legislation is both overinclusive and
underinclusive with regard to certain privileges); see also Note, Functional Overlap,
supra note 120 (exploring the results of a survey that indicate that there is substantial
overlap between the functions of attorneys and other professionals).
15 5 TOM ALIBRANDI & FRANK H. ARMANI, PRIVILEGED INFORMATION 4 (1984)
(quoting Bryce Nelson, Ethical Dilemma: Should Lawyers Turn in Clients?, L.A. TIMES,
July 2, 1974, at 1, 15).
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"[T]he attorney-client privilege may be invoked... with respect to:
(1) A communication (2) Made between privileged persons (3) In
confidence (4) For the purpose of obtaining or providing legal
assistance for the client."
156
Confidentiality enhances client-lawyer communications and
hence the effectiveness of the services provided because of three
interlocking assumptions.1 57  First, complying with legal obliga-
tions and vindicating rights are assumed to be matters too compli-
cated for a person without legal training. Second, it is assumed that
in order for a client to know the full extent of her rights and obliga-
tions, she must fully disclose to her lawyer all of the facts known to
her.158 Finally, it is assumed that "clients would be unwilling to
disclose personal, embarrassing, or unpleasant facts ... unless they
could be assured that neither they nor their lawyers could be called
later to testify" regarding such communications.
159
When these underlying assumptions are put in the framework
of Wigmore's criteria, it is clear that the attorney-client privilege is
primarily based on the four-part utilitarian/Wigmore analysis. First,
the attorney-client communication originates in confidence-those
who come to attorneys anticipate that their conversations will not
be disclosed. In fact, lawyers have a professional duty to safeguard
confidential client information.
160
Second, the confidence between attorney and client is necessary
in order for the relationship to function properly. 6 ' The American
system of justice is an adversarial one.162 In order for justice to
be done under an adversarial system, each side must have effective
assistance of counsel.163 In order to represent his client effectively
15 RESTATEMENT, THE LAw GOVERNING LAWYERS § 118 (Tentative Draft No. 2,
1989).
1' See id. § 118 cmt. c at 75.
158 Full disclosure by clients also serves a clear public interest by contributing to
the efficient adjudication of trials and other proceedings. See id. at 75-76.
159 Id. at 76.
'6 See id. § 111 cmt. a.
161 See id. § 118 cmt. c at 76 (asserting that it is widely assumed that clients would
not be as candid with their lawyers if they suspected their communications might
expose the "client[s] to adverse evidentiary risks").
162 See STEPHAN LANDSMAN, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL
JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO ADJUDICATION 1 (1988) (defining the United
States adversarial system).
" See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,684-85 (1984) (stating that the Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel is crucial to the adversarial
system).
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and assist the client in making informed decisions, a lawyer must
know all facts relevant to his client's case."6  By providing a
privilege, the client is encouraged to communicate fully and frankly
with the lawyer even as to legally damaging subject matter.16 5 For
example, if the attorney is not certain of his client's guilt or
innocence, he cannot effectively represent the client, thus burden-
ing judicial resources.
Third, the community believes that the relationship is important
because it allows for the better functioning of the judicial process
upon which the community relies. 166  Despite the fact that the
attorney-client privilege unquestionably results in the exclusion of
certain evidence that might be highly probative, society has
determined that this is a relationship worthy of protection.
167
Lastly, the benefit to society outweighs the injury. A guilty
individual would have no incentive to share the confidence with his
attorney, if there were no guarantee that the communication would
be protected. If no protection existed, the attorney would not have
the information. He would be unable to assist in the fact-finding
inquiry as in the case in which the privilege prevented him from
disclosing the information he had obtained by virtue of his profes-
sional position. Thus, society would lose very little by providing the
privilege since the attorney would not be able to provide any
assistance either to society or to the client without knowledge of the
event.
I" See REsTATEMENT, THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 118 cmt. c at 75 (stating
that the general assumption is that "in the absence of such full disclosure by a client
.. a sufficiently full measure of legal assistance cannot be realized"); United States
v. Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252, 272 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (stating in a discovery order that
counsel needs to know certain information to be effective).
165 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt. 4 (1994)
(explaining that confidentiality helps to promote the full disclosure between attorney
and client that is necessary for competent representaton).
"n See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (noting that the
attorney-client privilege furthers societal interests in compliance with the law and
vindication of rights).
167 In addition to society's reliance on the effective functioning of the judicial
system, another reason why society may view the privilege as valuable is that it may
make clients more inclined to discuss their putative activities before taking action.
Society has not only an interest in the efficient operation of the judicial system, but
also an arguably stronger interest in deterrence. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W.
ScoTt, JR., CRIMINAL LAw 10 (2d ed. 1986) (noting that one aim of the criminal law
is to prevent harm to society). Society's interest in granting the privilege, then, may
actually outweigh the probative value of the evidence. Thus, by granting this "safe
harbor," an attorney can provide advice that might prevent future crimes from
occurring.
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Because of its historic underpinnings and the clear rationale for
providing a privilege,1" all jurisdictions have some form of




The spousal, or husband-wife, privilege is another privilege that
was recognized at common law. The early privilege was premised
on the concept that a husband and wife were one and the same-a
woman at that time was not considered to have a legal existence
separate from her husband's.
170
In Hawkins v. United States,171 the Supreme Court addressed
the privilege and held that a wife could not testify against her hus-
band. 172 More recently, however, the Supreme Court, in Trammel
v. United States,17 held that the rationale behind Hawkins was
outdated and that the privilege swept too broadly:
No other testimonial privilege sweeps so broadly. The privileges
between priest and penitent, attorney and client, and physician
and patient limit protection to private communications. These
privileges are rooted in the imperative need for confidence and
trust. The priest-penitent privilege recognizes the human need to
disclose to a spiritual counselor, in total and absolute confidence,
what are believed to be flawed acts or thoughts and to receive
priestly consolation and guidance in return. The lawyer-client
privilege rests on the need for the advocate and counselor to know
all that relates to the client's reasons for seeking representation if
" The attorney-client privilege may also be justified under the functionalist
rationale discussed in supra part II.A.3. Attorneys wear numerous hats, one of which
is that of counselor. As a counselor, an attorney is engaging in a function society has
deemed valuable, that of counseling for treatment of a problem.
169 See RESTATEMENT, THE LAw GOVERNING LAwYERS tit. A, introductory note at
72 (noting that in every American jurisdiction neither a client nor a client's attorney
can be made to testify to reveal the contents of their confidential communications).
For further discussion of the history of the attorney-client privilege, see MCCORMICK,
supra note 133, § 87, at 204; 8 WIGMORF, supra note 132, § 2290, at 542; Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REV.
1061 (1978).
..0 See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 52 (1980) (describing the
foundation ofspousal privileges as premised on the concept that women were chattel
and thus were denied legal status); Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 75 (1958)
(stating that there was a prevailing fiction that a husband and wife were one person).
1 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
See id. at 78-79.
17 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
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the professional mission is to be carried out. Similarly, the
physician must know all that a patient can articulate in order to
identify and to treat disease; barriers to full disclosure would
impair diagnosis and treatment.
174
Until Trammel, the husband-wife privilege protected not merely
confidential but all communications between spouses. This broad
exclusion, the Court held, was unacceptable given the predominant
role accorded to truth-finding in the judicial process. The end
result was a narrowing of the spousal privilege. Instead of vesting
the privilege in the hands of the spouse revealing the information,
the privilege was granted to the spouse who was told the informa-
tion.175 Therefore, it was the choice of the listener to decide
whether or not to testify. The spouse who was told the damaging
information could not be precluded from testifying by the spouse
who revealed the information.
176
The privacy rationale provides a compelling justification for the
husband-wife privilege. The proponents of the rationale do not
provide any clear test for determining whether a relationship falls
within the "zone of privacy" except to say that "the scope of [the]
private sphere includes those highly personal relationships and
activities whose just moral independence requires special protection
from a hostile public interest." 177 One may, however, gain insight
from the Supreme Court's holding in Griswold v. Connecticut.178
The Griswold Court dealt specifically with privacy in the marital
context. The Court explained that "[m]arriage is a coming together
for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the
degree of being sacred. " 179  Since marriage is an association
clearly coming within the zone of privacy protection, the husband-
wife privilege is easily justified under this rationale.
18 0
174 Id. at 51.
'75 See id. at 53.
176 See id.
17 DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONsTrruTION 243 (1986), quoted
in GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONsTITUTIONAL LAW 920 (2d ed. 1991) (discussing
the scope of the Griswold decision in the realm of privacy).
1 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
1
79 Id. at 486.
IS Note that there is also an argument for applying a utilitarian rationale to this
privilege. When a husband confides in his wife, he expects his disclosure to remain
secure. In order for the marital relationship to be successful, each spouse must feel
certain that he or she can trust the other. Marriage is unquestionably a relationship
that is highly valued by our society. Furthermore, the injury created by extending the
privilege is outweighed by the benefit. This is so for two reasons. First, the harm
inflicted on society as a result of the breakup of the family would likely be greater
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3. Priest-Penitent Privilege
It is generally agreed that there was no priest-penitent 8 1
privilege at common law.18 2 The privilege does, however, arise by
statute. 183 The priest-penitent privilege is now firmly rooted in
modern jurisprudence.
184
It should first be noted that the priest-penitent privilege is
justifiable under the privacy rationale. For example, the court in
Keenan v. Gigante85 explained that the priest-penitent privilege
must be construed to "encourage uninhibited communications
between persons standing in a relation of confidence and trust."
1 86
Additionally, the Communion Office from the Anglican Church
illustrates the important role privacy plays in its church: "And if
than the benefit society would derive from the correct disposal of the litigation.
Second, a spouse would likely refuse to give the information in order to protect the
other, thus, wasting preciousjudicial resources. Although Wigmore believed that the
husband-wife privilege should exist, he felt that in its application the privilege swept
much too broadly in that it encompassed all communications between the husband
and wife, despite the fact that not all communications are intended to be confidential
when made. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 132, § 2338, at 665-66. In modern day
jurisprudence many states have enacted statutes that limit the husband-wife privilege
especially in custody cases, child abuse cases, and spousal abuse cases. See, e.g., FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 90.504(3) (West 1976) (stating that there is no privilege in cases brought
by one spouse against another or in certain criminal proceedings); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 209.060 (Michie 1976) (stating that the husband-wife privilege does not
exclude evidence in cases regarding abuse, neglect, or exploitation of an adult); VA.
CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.11 (Michie 1975) (stating that the husband-wife privilege does
not apply in child abuse cases).
181 The priest-penitent privilege when discussed in this Comment is meant to
include members of all religious denominations. Thus, the term "priest" also includes
rabbis and ministers. The term "priest" or "clergyperson" should be understood to
mean any and all "spiritual leaders."
"85 See Yolanda L. Ayala & Thomas C. Martyn, To Tell or Not to Tell? An Analysis
of Testimonial Privileges: The Parent-Child and Reporter's Privileges, 9 ST. JOHN'S J.
LEGAL COMMENT. 163, 163 (1993) (stating that only the attorney-client and spousal
privileges were recognized at common law).
"85 For a list of statutes regarding privileged communications and the clergy, see
JOHN C. BUSH & WILLIAM H. TIEMANN, THE RIGHT TO SILENCE: PRIVILEGED CLERGY
COMMUNICATION AND THE LAW 223 app. I (3d ed., Abingdon Press 1989) (1964). All
50 states have recognized the clergy privilege in some form. See id.
"4 See e.g., Seidman v. Fishburne-Hudgins Educ. Found., 724 F.2d 413, 415 (4th
Cir. 1984) (noting the clergy's status as a "repository for the confessant's confi-
dences"); Eckmann v. Board of Educ., 106 F.R.D. 70,72 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (holding that
a nun's position as a spiritual counselor allowed for invocation of the privilege);
Kruglikov v. Kruglikov, 217 N.Y.S.2d 845, 847 (Sup. Ct. 1961) (providing a privilege
for a rabbi who acted in the capacity of a marital counselor).
1- 390 N.E.2d 1151 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 887 (1979).
'86Id. at 1154.
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there be any of you whose conscience is troubled or grieved in
anything, lacking comfort or counsel, let him come to me... and
confess and open his grief secretly .... 187 The information
being shared is highly personal in nature. The relationship is not
simply a private one, it is a sacred one. Thus, this communication
should be privileged under a privacy rationale. "'[S]ociety's interest
in assuring the development of religious institutions would be
damaged if the privacy of penitential communications were not
respected.'
188
The priest-penitent privilege may also be justified from a
functionalist perspective. In Trammel v. United States,"9 a case that
dealt with spousal privilege, the Supreme Court stated that there is
a "need to disclose to a spiritual counselor, in total and absolute
confidence, what are believed to be flawed acts or thoughts and to
receive priestly consolation and guidance in return."9 0 Under
most laws, in order for communications to spiritual advisors to be
deemed privileged, the statements must be "(1) made to ministers,
priests or rabbis; (2) in their professional character; (3) in the
course of discipline enjoined; (4) by the rules of practice of the
denomination to which they belong."'9 1 More importantly, some
privilege laws require that the communication be penitential in
nature. 192 The scope of the privilege, although often questioned,
is usually held to include communications made in "pursuance of
that church discipline which gives rise to the confessional rela-
tion."
193
The fact that the priest's role is to console and treat the penitent
and that the communication must be penitential in nature cuts in
18 JOHN T. MCNEILL, A HISToRY OF THE CURE OF SOULS 220 (1951).
" Dubbelday, supra note 27, at 790 n.91 (quotingJacob M. Yellin, The History and
Current Status of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 95, 113-14
(1983)).
189 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
190 Id. at 51.
191 BUSH & TIEMANN, supra note 183, at 102.
19 See id.
' In re Estate of Soeder, 220 N.E.2d 547, 568 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966) (stating that
the priest-penitent privilege only applies when made in pursuance of the discipline
enjoined); see also Ball v. State, 419 N.E.2d 137, 139-40 (Ind. 1981) (holding that no
privilege attaches if confession and confidentiality are not tenets of the church).
Numerous statutes have made the "discipline enjoined" language part of their
statutory requirement for a priest-penitent privilege. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-166
(1986 & Supp. 1994) (stating that not all communications with clergy are privileged,
and that "[t]o be privileged, the communication must be penitential in character and
must be made to the clergyman in his professional capacity").
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favor of finding a privilege under the functionalist rationale. The
priest is providing counseling and treatment, functions that could
not be served unless secrecy is inviolable. Since these are functions
society has chosen to protect,1 9 4 communications between priest
and penitent, made in pursuance of those functions, ought to be
privileged. 9 '
4. Doctor-Patient Privilege
Like the priest-penitent privilege, the doctor-patient privi-
lege 196 arises by statute rather than as a result of common law.
197
Nevertheless, it is one of the most widely recognized privileges.
198
The privilege between a doctor and patient was enacted because of
a realization that a "physician must know all that a patient can
articulate in order to identify and to treat disease; barriers to full
disclosure would impair diagnosis and treatment."199
19 Cf Fisher, supra note 151, at 640 (discussing Note, Functional Overlap, supra
note 120, stating that "certain types of relationships should be kept confidential, one
of which is that of the counselor," and advocating extension of a privilege for that
function); see also Note, Functional Overlap, supra note 120, at 1257-58 (arguing that
privilege should be extended to those professionals whose counseling requires
confidentiality).
-' Although Wigmore advocated such a privilege, see 8 WIGMORE, supra note 132,
§ 2396, at 878 (discussing how the propriety of the privilege may be tested by four
canons laid down for privileged communications), itsjustification under the utilitarian
analysis is questionable. No empirical studies have assessed the importance of
confidentiality to the penitential setting, and thus the second prong of the analysis is
difficult to meet. Moreover, the third prong mandating that society ought to foster
this relationship implicates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. See
Robert L. Stoyles, The Dilemma of the Constitutionality ofthe Priest-Penitent Privilege-The
Application of the Religion Clauses, 29 U. Prrr. L. REV. 27, 27-28 (1968) (arguing that
the priest-penitent privilege violates the Establishment Clause). By providing an
avenue by which people may make disclosures to religious leaders who are then
protected by the law, the government may appear to be endorsing religion.
" Note that although some courts lump the doctor-patient and psychotherapist-
patient privileges together, this Comment will maintain a distinction between the two.
Many states as well as many courts, including the Supreme Court, see Proposed Fed.
R. Evid. 502-510, 56 F.R.D. 183, 234-56 (1973) (listing privileges proposed by the
Supreme Court including the psychotherapist-patient privilege, but not including the
physician-patient privilege), are more willing to justify the psychotherapist-patient
privilege. See, e.g., Lora v. Board of Educ., 74 F.R.D. 565, 575 (E.D.N.Y. 1977)
(arguing that the psychotherapist-patient privilege is more necessary than the doctor-
patient privilege); State v. Aucoin, 362 So. 2d 503, 505 (La. 1978) (same).
' See Ayala & Martyn, supra note 182, at 164.
'g For a list of states that have adopted the physician-patient privilege and the
respective statutes, see Shuman & Weiner, supra note 120, at 907-11. Forty states and
the District of Columbia have adopted a physician-patient privilege. See id. at 907.
"' Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980).
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Patients may be deterred from seeking medical treatment
altogether if they fear betrayal. 20 The doctor-patient privilege,
justifiable under the functionalist rationale, rests on the premise
that the responsibilities involved by virtue of the professional
position, counseling and treatment, mandate that some kind of
confidentiality be maintained and that any threat to that confidenti-
ality would hinder the ability of the professional in her functional
role of treating and counseling.2 1 In order to narrow the scope
of the physician-patient privilege, many courts have limited the
privilege to communications made in the course of seeking treat-
ment.2 2  This limitation fits neatly with the functionalist ratio-
nale. 203  Only those communications made in the course of
seeking treatment for an ailment, which is the function society seeks
to protect, are meant to be protected.
2 °1
2'0 See State v. George, 575 P.2d 511, 515 (Kan. 1978) (holding that the doctor-
patient privilege is necessary for adequate medical treatment). Empirical support for
this proposition is uncertain. For this reason, critics argue that the doctor-patient
privilege should not obtain under the utilitarian rationale's second and fourth prong.
Indeed, Wigmore was a vigorous opponent of the physician-patient privilege. See 8
WIGMORE, supra note 132, § 2380a, at 830; see also United States v. University Hosp.,
575 F. Supp. 607, 611 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) ("There is... no doctor-patient evidentiary
privilege in a federal court proceeding except with respect to an element of a daim
or defense as to which state law supplies the rule of decision."), aft'd, 729 F.2d 144
(2d Cir. 1984). Though proponents disagree, see Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 595
(1977) (stating that withholding the privilege would be damaging because people
would refuse to go to doctors to receive necessary narcotic treatments if identifying
information were released), justification under the utilitarian rationale is suspect.
201 See People v. Deadmond, 683 P.2d 763, 769 (Colo. 1984) (en banc) (holding
that the privilege encourages patients to disclose all information which is necessary
in order to secure adequate medical treatment).
21 See, e.g., Hinote v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 463 N.E.2d 531, 534 (Ind. 1984)
(holding that to be privileged, the communications must be necessary for treatment
or diagnosis); State v. Mayhew, 170 N.W.2d 608, 615 (Iowa 1969) (same); Beasley v.
Grand Trunk W.R.R., 282 N.W.2d 401,410 (Mich. 1979) (holding that information
necessary for a "fruitful and complete" examination was encompassed within the
doctor-patient privilege).
213 See, e.g., Binder v. Ruvell, No. 52C2535, (Ill. Cir. Ct.June 24, 1952), reported in,
150 JAMA 1241 (1952), quoted in Fisher, supra note 151, at 639 (distinguishing
between the functions of a physician and a psychiatrist and noting that a privilege
should only be afforded to the latter).
'2' This limitation is also in accord with the privacy rationale. Not all aspects of
the relationship are private, but conversations dealing with one's health have often
been deemed within the private sphere. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598
(1977) (noting that individuals have an interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters as well as an interest in the independence to make certain kinds of important
decisions).
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C. The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege: A Parallel
The psychotherapist-patient relationship is, in many ways,
similar to the therapeutic relationship that exists between members
of a self-help group. In scrutinizing the rationales given in support
of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the need for some kind of
self-help privilege becomes more apparent.
Psychotherapy enables a patient or client to discuss fears and
anxieties in order to overcome them and cope with them. 0 5 In
order for a psychotherapist-patient relationship to flourish, it is
imperative that a client be able "fully to disclose the nature and
details of his illness ... without fear of later revelation by one in
whom he placed his trust and confidence." 2 6  The Supreme
Court, when it endorsed the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence on
privilege °2 0 (which were eventually rejected by Congress), agreed
that there was a need for a psychotherapist-patient privilege.
208
As one federal district court judge explained, "[t]he commentators
have recognized [that a] . . . psychotherapist's capacity to help her
patients is completely dependent on their willingness and ability to
talk freely."
20 9
1. The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
Is Justifiable Under Wigmore's
Utilitarian Analysis
Approaching the law of privilege from a utilitarian perspective,
it is clear that communication made in the context of the psycho-
therapist-patient relationship should be protected. First, the
2o See Louis Everstine, Law and Psychotherapy: The State of the Relationship, in
PSYCHOTHERAPY AND THE LAW, supra note 121, at 3, 3 (stating that psychotherapy
consists of talking for the purpose of alleviating emotional distress); see also Fisher,
supra note 151, at 619 (describing the nature of the psychotherapeutic relationship).
0 Perry v. Fiumano, 403 N.Y.S.2d 382, 384 (App. Div. 1978).
'o
7 See Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 502-510, 56 F.R.D. 183, 234-56 (1972).
The Advisory Committee for the Supreme Court's Proposed Rules of Evidence
in its comments on the psychotherapist-patient privilege noted that "'there is wide
agreement that confidentiality is a sine qua non for successful psychiatric treat-
ment.... A threat to secrecy blocks successful treatment.'" Proposed Fed. R. Evid.
504 advisory committee's note, 56 F.R.D. at 242 (quoting GROUP FOR THE ADVANCE-
MENT OF PSYCHIATRY, REPORT No. 45, CONFIDENTIALITY AND PRIVILEGED COMMUNICA-
TIONS IN THE PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY 92 (1960)).
'-0 Miller v. Colonial Refrigerated Transp., 81 F.R.D. 741, 747 (M.D. Pa. 1979)
(citing MCCORMICK, supra note 133, § 99 n.9).
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communication arises in confidence-patients tell their psychothera-
pists their most intimate of secrets.
Second, confidentiality is necessary for the success of the
relationship. It is imperative that the patient be able to discuss her
problems fully. Since people will be less willing to talk if they are
aware that their confidences will not be legally protected from
compelled disclosure,2 1 the relationship cannot survive without
confidentiality. The relationship between a psychotherapist and her
patient is premised on the ability of the two to communicate.
Without communication, there is no relationship. The connection
between client and professional would be nonexistent without the
promise of full confidentiality.
Third, the relationship is one that should be fostered since
society is better off when its citizens are mentally healthy.
2'1
Furthermore, society should foster the relationship because the
client is seeking to heal herself. To the extent that one of the goals
of the criminal justice system is to reform criminals so that they will
not desire or need to commit further crimes,21 2 litigation becomes
unnecessary since rehabilitation is already occurring as a result of
the relationship.
Finally, the injury to the relationship from compelled disclosure
outweighs the benefit to the litigation from such a disclosure. As
noted above, society benefits to the extent that clients use the
psychotherapist relationship to heal themselves and prevent
themselves from committing future crimes. If the primary purpose
of the justice system is either rehabilitation or protecting society
from criminals, then society's benefit from granting the privilege
clearly outweighs the cost to the litigation, since the benefits of the
210 See Donald Schmid et al., Confidentiality in Psychiatry: A Study of the Patient's
View, 34 HosP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 353-54 (1983) (stating that a study of 30
patients revealed that a statistically significant number of the patients would be upset
and less likely to share information if their confidences were released to a court);
Shuman & Weiner, supra note 120, at 894 (arguing that individuals would hesitate to
consult psychotherapists if no privilege existed); Note, Functional Overlap, supra note
120, at 1262. But see Ralph Slovenko, Psychotherapist-Patient Testimonial Privilege: A
Picture of Misguided Hope, 23 CATH. U. L. REv. 649,650 (1974) (arguing that there has
been no showing that privilege is necessary for the effective functioning of the
relationship).
211 See Kathleen L. Cerveny & MariaJ. Kent, Recent Decisions: Evidence Law-The
Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in Federal Courts, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 791, 798-99
(1984) (stating that "society benefits from its members' health, both in body and
mind").
212 See LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 167, at 24 (describing rehabilitation as one of
the theories behind punishment and criminal law).
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litigation-rehabilitation and protecting society from dangerous
criminals-are already being realized.
2. The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
Is Justifiable Under the
Privacy Rationale
Some commentators have argued that the psychotherapist-
patient privilege is justified not through the utilitarian rationale, but
as a legitimate privacy concern. The Supreme Court has recognized
that the due process right to privacy encompasses an individual's
right to control the dissemination of information about herself.213
Also included within this right is the right to the inviolability of the
body,214 and the right to make decisions about one's body free
from governmental interference. 211 Since the right to privacy has
been applied most often in the context of decisions regarding one's
bodily health, autonomy, and reputation, it seems that information
regarding those same types of decisions (treatment for mental and
physical ailments) should also be protected within this zone of
privacy. Some courts have agreed. 16  The patient's privacy
interest is legally relevant and should be accorded weight when
determining whether or not to grant a privilege to a psychothera-
pist-patient relationship.
2 17
235 See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457-60 (1977) (stating
that "public officials, including the President, are not wholly without constitutionally
protected privacy rights in matters of personal life"); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589,
599 (1977) (noting that individuals have an interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters).
214 See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173-74 (1952) (holding that forcible
pumping of a suspect's stomach violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process
right).
2'5 See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) (holding that matters relating to
procreation, contraception, and family relationships are protected from governmental
interference by the privacy interest); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973)
(determining that the decision to have an abortion falls within the right to privacy).
216 See Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064, 1068 n.9 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that
the constitutional right to privacy protects the confidentiality of psychotherapist-
patient relations), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977); In re Lifschutz, 467 P.2d 557,567-
68 (Cal. 1970) (stating that a patient's right to preserve the confidentiality of
communications made to a psychotherapist is based on both the California Evidence
Code and the right of privacy embodied in the federal Constitution); In re "B", 394
A.2d 419, 425 (Pa. 1978) (concluding that the psychotherapist-patient privilege is
rooted in the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions).
217 For a more extensive discussion on the right to privacy and its application to
the psychotherapist and physician privileges, see Developments, supra note 129, at
1545-48 (discussing the Supreme Court's recognition of privacy interests).
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3. The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege Is Justifiable
Under the Functionalist Rationale
Those who argue from the functionalist perspective maintain
that since psychotherapists perform a counseling function in aid of
treatment, a function that has been deemed worthy of legal
protection, the psychotherapeutic relationship merits a privilege.
Most functionalists agree that the psychotherapist is not being given
a privilege because of her professional occupation. Instead, the
privilege is accorded only to those therapists who are acting in a
counseling capacity. Similarly, the scope of the privilege should be
limited to communications made in the context of the counseling
relationship. 218  In Binder v. Ruvel 2"9 the court recognized
that confidentiality is vital for the functioning of the psychothera-
peutic relationship. 22' Functionalists argue that a privilege should
be accorded to those relationships that exist solely to serve a
counseling function, and where confidentiality is necessary for that
counseling to be effective.
2 21
The federal courts are in conflict regarding whether a psycho-
therapist-patient privilege exists.222 Despite the courts' confusion,
218 See David W. Louisell, The Psychologist in Today's Legal World (pt. 2), 41 MINN.
L. REv. 731,738-39 (1957) (discussing the need for a functional approach to privilege
law, specifically in the psychotherapist-patient context).
29 No. 52C2535 (Ill. Cir. Ct. June 24, 1952), reported in 150 JAMA 1241 (1952),
quoted in Fisher, supra note 151, at 639 (distinguishing between the functions of a
physician and a psychiatrist and noting that a privilege should only be afforded to the
latter).
'o See Fisher, supra note 151, at 619.
"' See id. at 631 (arguing for a functional approach to the psychotherapist-client
privilege and discussing policies supporting the privilege); Comment, The Psychothera-
pist-Patient Privilege: Are Some Patients More Privileged Than Others?, 10 PAC. L.J. 801,
803-04 (1979) (arguing that a privilege statute's focus should be the function of the
therapy and not the status of the individual and that to hold otherwise violates the
Equal Protection Clause); Comment, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in Washington:
Extending the Privilege to Community Mental Health Clinics, 58 WAsH. L. REv. 565, 576
(1983) (arguing that professionals in mental health clinics perform the same functions
as psychologists and should, therefore, be accorded the same privilege).
See In re Doe, 964 F.2d 1325, 1328-29 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that a
qualified psychotherapist-patient privilege exists in federal court); In re Zuniga,
714 F.2d 632, 639 (6th Cir. 1983) (same). But see United States v. Moore, 970 F.2d
48, 50 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that a psychotherapist-patient privilege does not
exist in federal courts); United States v. Bercier, 848 F.2d 917, 920 (8th Cir. 1988)
(same); United States v. Corona, 849 F.2d 562, 567 (11th Cir. 1988) (reasoning that
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some form of psychotherapist-patient privilege has been adopted in
the majority of states whether by statute 22 or by the courts of
no psychotherapist-patient privilege exists because none was recognized at common
law and stating that the courts should not create new privileges lightly). The Corona
court's refusal to create a new privilege could be a result of the Supreme Court's
muddled stance regarding whether and when federal courts may create noncommon
law privileges. For an extensive discussion of the confusion, see Daniel J. Capra,
Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege and Federal Rules, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 8, 1993, at 3; see also
University of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 188-95 (1990) (reasoning that there should
not be a privilege for information derived from a university's confidential peer review
process).
22 See e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-26-2 (1975) (stating that confidential communica-
tions between licensed psychotherapists and clients are afforded the same privilege
as those between attorney and client and explaining that disclosure of such
communications is not mandated by law); ALASKA STAT. § 08.86.200 (1991 & Supp.
1994) (stating that a psychologist may not reveal communications with her client
made in a professional capacity unless authorized in writing by the client or under
other limited circumstances); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-2085 (1992) (stating that
licensed psychologists must not disclose confidential communications with their
clients unless otherwise mandated by law); ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-96-105 (Michie
1992) (same as ALA. CODE § 34-26-2); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-9 0-10 7(g) (1987 & Supp.
1994) (stating that a licensed psychologist, her staff, and persons who have
participated in psychological therapy shall not testify regarding confidential
communications without licensee's consent); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146c (West
1991 & Supp. 1995) (stating that, except as otherwise provided, "all communications
shall be privileged and a psychologist shall not disclose any such communications
unless the person or his authorized representative consents to waive the privi-
lege"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.503 (West 1979 & Supp. 1995) (stating that a patient
may refuse to disclose and prevent others who are participating in the diagnosis or
treatment of the patient from disclosing confidential communications arising out of
such diagnosis or treatment); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-39-16 (1994) (same as ALA. CODE
§ 34-26-2); IDAHO CODE § 54-2314 (1994) (explaining that a licensed psychologist
may not be examined in court about confidential communications with her client
without written consent and that the psychologist-client relationship is afforded
the same privilege as the attorney-client relationship); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 740,
para. 110/10 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (stating that a therapist and her client have the
privilege to refuse to disclose and prevent the disclosure of the client's record or
communications unless the patient introduces his mental condition as an element of
the claim or defense and such testimony is not unduly prejudicial or inflammatory);
IND. CODE ANN. § 25-33-1-17 (West 1993 & Supp. 1995) (preventing psychologists
from revealing communications with their clients unless the communication relates
directly to a homicide trial, a mental competency proceeding, a mental competency
defense, a malpractice proceeding against a psychologist, or a proceeding to
determine the validity of a will, or unless the psychologist has the express consent
of the client); IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.10 (West Supp. 1995) (stating that a mental
health professional may not testify about confidential communications with her client
unless the client waives the privilege, or if the testimony is taken in a civil action
in which the mental condition of the person in whose favor the privilege is given puts
mental condition in issue); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-5323 (1992) (same as ALA. CODE
§ 34-26-2); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 9-109 (1995) (applying a privilege
unless, inter alia, the patient or her representative introduces her mental condition
as a claim or defense, makes a claim of malpractice against the psychotherapist, or
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waives the privilege); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 233, § 20B (Law. Co-op. 1986 & Supp.
1995) (stating that a patient may refuse to disclose and may prevent witnesses from
disclosing any communications between the patient and psychotherapist relating to
the patient's diagnosis or treatment); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1750 (West
1992) (stating that a psychotherapist shall not disclose privileged communications
about her client except in specified circumstances); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 5 95 .0 2(g)
(West Supp. 1995) (stating that a psychologist may not disclose professional
conversations with a patient without the patient's consent); MIss. CODE ANN.
§ 73-31-29 (1995) (stating that a psychologist may not be examined regarding
confidential patient information without the patient's consent); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 337.055 (Vernon 1989) (stating that a licensed psychologist may not be examined
or made to testify about privileged communications with her client); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 26-1-807 (1993) (same as ALA. CODE § 34-26-2); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-504
(1989 & Supp. 1994) (stating that a patient may prevent disclosure of confidential
communications among herself, her psychologist, and other persons participating in
diagnosis or treatment except where the information is relevant to a trial issue
raised by the patient, to a proceeding to hospitalize the patient for her condition
(where ajudge orders that the patient's condition be analyzed), or to a proceeding
regarding injuries to children or the unlawful acquisition of a controlled sub-
stance); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 49-225 to -245 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1993)
(providing a patient with a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any
other person from disclosing confidential communications regarding diagnosis and
treatment); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 330-A:19 (1995) (carving an exception to the
privilege in cases in which involuntary emergency admissions to mental health
institutions are at issue); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:14B-28 (West 1995) (likening the
psychotherapist-patient relationship to an attorney-client relationship and prevent-
ing disclosure except in competency hearings, will validity hearings, and intestate
succession disputes); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-9-18 (Michie 1993) (affording a privilege
to communications made to a licensed psychologist and her staff); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L.
& R. 4507 (McKinney 1992) (placing the confidential communications and relations
between a psychologist and her client on the same basis as those provided by law
between attorney and client); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.3 (Supp. 1992) (giving the
judge discretion to compel disclosure for the necessary administration of justice);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4732.19 (Anderson 1994) (giving the same protection to
communications between psychologist and patient as between physician and patient);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2503 (West 1993) (identifying exceptions to the physician-
and psychotherapist-patient privilege for proceedings to hospitalize the patient for
mental illness, court-ordered examination of the physical, mental, or emotional
condition of the patient, and for proceedings in which the condition of the patient
is an element of the claim or defense); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.230 (1988) (allowing
the patient, guardian, conservator, or personal representative of the patient or
the psychotherapist to claim the psychotherapist-patient privilege); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 5-37.3-4 (Supp. 1994) (providing that a psychologist may not disclose patient
communications except in certain enumerated circumstances); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. §§ 19-13-6 to -11 (1995), § 36-27A-38 (1994) (combining provisions of
Oklahoma and New Mexico statutes); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-61-602 (Supp. 1995)
(providing that a psychologist may not disclose confidential communications unless
authorized by the client or mandated by state or federal law regarding child abuse
reporting, abuse of disabled adults, reporting of a communicable disease, or other
relevant laws); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1612 (Supp. 1995) (providing that a
mental health professional cannot disclose information acquired from a patient in a
professional capacity, includingjoint and group counseling sessions); VA. CODE ANN.
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those states. 22  Thus, it is clear that the privilege should apply in
the psychotherapist-patient relationship.
III. APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE: THE
NEED FOR A PRIVILEGE IN THE
SELF-HELP CONTEXT
Having established the importance of confidentiality in the self-
help setting, and having looked at the rationales for currently
recognized privileges, this Comment will now turn to the question
whether a privilege should be accorded in the self-help setting and
whether such a privilege can be justified under the recognized
rationales.
22 5
A. The Utilitarian Rationale
In applying the utilitarian rationale to the mutual aid context,
many of the reasons for granting a privilege in the psychotherapist-
patient context are applicable. Wigmore's four criteria demonstrate
that a self-help privilege should be recognized.
§ 8.01-400.2 (Michie 1992) (providing a privilege for counselors, social workers,
psychologists and their clients except in certain circumstances); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 18.83.110 (West Supp. 1995) (same as ALA. CODE § 34-26-2); W. VA. CODE
§ 27-3-1 (1992) (providing a privilege for information that may identify a patient
except, inter alia, where there is a need for the information to be conveyed to
medical staff for effective treatment or prevention of imminent danger or where
the court finds that the information is sufficiently relevant to outweigh the need
for confidentiality); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 905.04 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994) (providing
for psychologist-patient confidentiality except in certain circumstances); WYO.
STAT. § 33-27-123 (Supp. 1993) (providing for confidentiality for information
exchanged amongpatient, psychologist, and her staff); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1014 (West
1995) (stating that a psychotherapist's patient (whether or not she is a party)
has a privilege to refuse to disclose confidential communications); HAW. R. EVID.
504.1 (same as FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.503); LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 510 (West 1995)
(allowing a patient to refuse to disclose a confidential communication made for
the purpose of advice, diagnosis, or treatment of a condition). Note that these
statutes differ widely in scope. The definition of who is included within the
term "psychotherapist" varies, as does the extent of the protection.
2 See, e.g., Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411, 418 (Alaska 1976) (recognizing a
common law psychotherapist-patient privilege).
22 Seesupra part II.A (discussing the rationales). In applying the rationales to the
self-help context, this Comment applies the rationales as if dealing with a self-help
group like A.A. A discussion of which groups should be accorded a privilege and
which are not so deserving follows. See infra part IV.A.
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1. The Communication Is Made with the
Expectation of Privacy
The first of Wigmore's criteria is certainly met because the
communication is made with the expectation of absolute confidenti-
ality.226 In many self-help group meetings, confidentiality is not
only expected, it is demanded. 227 Members are reminded at the
beginning of each meeting that what they hear and discuss must
never leave the confines of the discussion room.228 In group
therapy where a professional is present, the professional explains to
members of the group that confidentiality is expected.
229
Critics of the privilege argue that once a confidential communi-
cation is made in front of many people, the communication loses its
secret character. 230 In the context of therapy, however, people
expect their secret to remain in the "magic room"231 despite the
presence of large numbers of people. Although an A.A. meeting
might be quite large, the expectation of one who steps into that
room and participates in the discussion is that the revelations made
are meant to be shared only with those in the group.23 2 Indeed,
despite the size of some of these groups, confidentiality has been
maintained in the twelve-step context. 233 The fact that confidenti-
I6 Seesupra partL.C (explaininghow anonymity and confidentiality are vital to the
functioning of certain self-help groups).
Most group leaders discuss issues of confidentiality with their groups. In group
therapy, 87% of therapists reported discussing confidentiality. See Roback et al., supra
note 120, at 89. At the beginning of all twelve-step group meetings, there is some
mention of confidentiality when members are informed that "'[a]nything said in the
room stays in the room.'" See Lesieur, supra note 107, at 238 (discussing a typical
G.A. meeting).
21 See supra text accompanying note 67; see also supra part I.C (examining the
centrality of confidentiality to self-help/twelve-step programs).
SeeSlovenko, supra note 118, at407 ("Usually, group leaders make explicit the
expectation of confidentiality, and they repeat it during the course of therapy.").
"' See Appelbaum & Greer, supra note 21, at 311 (explaining that oftentimes the
presence of a third party vitiates the expectation of confidentiality and thus the
protection afforded by the privilege).
"' Slovenko, supra note 118, at 407 (using the term "magic room," as did a
patient, to describe the understanding that what goes on in the group therapy room
remains separate and confidential).
232 Cf. Lesieur, supra note 107, at 238 (noting that the chairperson of G.A.
meetings reminds the participants at each meeting that their revelations should be
kept confidential); Slovenko, supra note 118, at 407 (reporting that members of a
group therapy organization in Michigan believed that their confidences were kept
within the group).
23 See e.g., Slovenko, supra note 118, at 406 (explaining that the executive director
of the National Commission on Confidentiality of Health Records noted that no
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ality is maintained, despite the large number of people listening to
the revelation, is an indication of just how important trust and
secrecy are to members of the group.
23 4
Furthermore, the belief that the communication loses its status
as confidential when made in front of the group reflects a profound
misunderstanding of the way mutual aid therapy works.235  The
very name provides some insight. Mutual aid works because people
are sharing their problems with similarly situated people and in
doing so are helping themselves. If these "third parties" were not
there to listen, the therapy would be ineffective. 2 6 Thus, the fact
that the secret is shared within the group does not indicate a
incidents of group therapy breaches of confidentiality were reported to the
Commission). Specifically in the twelve-step context, only two cases have been
reported discussing breaches of confidentiality for statements made in the A.A.
context. One of those cases is the Cox case discussed supra notes 1-10. The other
case is State v. Boobar, 637 A.2d 1162 (Me. 1994). Ronald Boobar was found guilty
of murdering a 14-year-old girl. Boobar challenged the admissibility of the statements
of two witnesses, members of A.A., who voluntarily came forward to testify as to
certain statements made by Boobar to them. One member testified that he tried to
discourage Boobar from telling him about the events leading up to the murder
because they did not relate to the A.A. program. See id. at 1169 n.6. But Boobar
insisted. He maintained that his conversations with both members of A.A. were
inadmissible pursuant to Maine's evidentiary privileges which protect disclosures
made to licensed counselors and therapists. See id. at 1169. Boobar conceded that
the A.A. members were not licensed counselors but argued that they were
functionally similar and thus a privilege should obtain. See id. In making his
functionalist argument, Boobar pointed to a statute that specifically stated that "the
counsel and therapist licensure statute shall not be construed to prevent peer groups
or self-help groups from performing counseling." Id.; see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 32, § 13856(6) (West Supp. 1994) (providing that the licensure statute should not
serve to hinder other counseling groups). The court stated that despite the language
of the statute, it would be unreasonable to conclude that "the legislature intended to
sweep information disclosed to peer counselor or self-help groups like AA within the
privilege." Boobar, 637 A.2d at 1169 (discussing the Maine privilege statute protecting
counselors, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 13862 (West Supp. 1994)). The court also
refused to draw a parallel to the evidentiary privilege governing disclosure to
psychotherapists or to spiritual advisers. See id.; see also ME. R. EvID. 503(b)
(psychotherapists), 505(b) (spiritual advisers). Although the court agreed that the
A.A. members did serve some of the same functions that a therapist or member of
the clergy might serve, the court refused to extend the evidentiary privilege to
Boobar's disclosures to his fellow A.A. members. See Boobar, 637 A.2d at 1170.
m' See Slovenko, supra note 118, at 406 ("[W]ith so many people involved, such
secrecy is remarkable.").
2" Many people believe that once a communication is made in the presence of
"third parties," the communication loses its privileged status. Some have even gone
so far as to say that the psychotherapist's privilege is also invalidated in the group-
therapy context. See Appelbaum & Greer, supra note 21, at 311.
' See KATZ, supra note 33, at 33 (stating that a "major factor in the effectiveness
of self-help groups is the group process itself").
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willingness to tell the secret to every person in the world, but rather
to share it with people who can help the teller understand and deal
with her problem. Therefore, Wigmore's first criterion, that the
communication be made with the expectation of confidentiality, is
met.
2. Confidentiality Is Essential to the Satisfactory
Maintenance of the Relationship
In order to prove the second of Wigmore's criteria, that the
confidentiality must be essential to the satisfactory maintenance of
the relationship, more research must be conducted .3  Although no
study has been conducted regarding the importance of confiden-
tiality in the purely nonprofessional self-help setting, the studies
conducted regarding confidentiality in the professional context have
indicated a reluctance on the part of patients to disclose fully when
aware that the information could be revealed to a court.238  This
reluctance is equally applicable in the self-help context, if not more
applicable. In the professional context, patients believe that at the
very least professional ethical obligations will prevent disclosure of
their communications. 239 In the nonprofessional self-help context,
no such professional responsibility exists and only the confidence
members have in each other provides any protection. This
common-sense notion, coupled with the few studies that have been
conducted in the professional group therapy context, indicate that
confidentiality is essential to certain self-help relationships.
3. The Community Believes that the Self-Help
Group Should Be Fostered
The third criterion set forth by Wigmore is that the community
must believe that the relationship is worth fostering. Twelve-step
groups have enjoyed profound acceptance in the United States and
the world over.24 ' The number of groups that emulate A.A.
23 For a discussion of studies regarding the importance of confidentiality in the
therapeutic setting, see supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
z See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
2 See Smith, supra note 130, at 480-83 (listing ethical obligations for psychologists
and social workers regardingbreach of confidentiality); Weisberg& Wald,supra note
121, at 159 (arguing that most professions believe that confidentiality of information
is ethically required); id. at 193 (stating that patients rely on ethical conducts for
assurances of confidentiality).
2
1 See KATZ, supra note 33, at 1-3.
1995] -AND THE WISDOM TO KNOW THE DIFFERENCE" 291
demonstrates society's endorsement of such organizations.
241
Society has an interest in assuring that people are healthy as well as
productive, stable members of society. Self-help groups have
demonstrated their ability to help people control their antisocial
behaviors. Gamblers, alcoholics, and drug addicts come to these
meetings to talk about past acts of stealing, robbing, hurting people,
and driving while intoxicated or under the influence of alcohol and
drugs.242 Many of these people have seen psychologists in the past
with little success.24  The self-help program is what gets them
back on their feet. It is unquestionably in society's best interest to
have an emotionally stable and physically healthy citizenry. Self-
help groups are a cost-efficient means of achieving this goal.
4. The Injury to the Relationship from Disclosure
Would Outweigh the Benefits to the
Litigation Process
The fourth criterion asks if the injury to the relationship is
greater than the benefit to the litigation. Given the number of calls
that flooded the National Self-Help Clearinghouse after the
reporting of the Cox case, it is clear that people are concerned
about the lack of legal protection for their disclosures in the self-
help setting.
244
Without the assurance of confidentiality, people will not share
their secrets, especially revelations that may have legal ramifica-
tions.245  In the self-help context, this presents a very difficult
problem. Part of the self-help process involves admitting past bad
acts, and in the context of addiction, this will often mean admitting
illegal bad acts. 246 The healing process is thus profoundly affected
if there is a reluctance to share information regarding past illegal
behavior.2 4  Therefore, the decision not to accord a privilege
241 See supra text accompanying note 64.
242 See ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 68, at 353-55 (telling the story of a
teenager who went to A.A. after a drunk driving incident); supra notes 1-10 and
accompanying text (discussing the Cox case).
243 See generally Bohlen, supra note 24, at 34 (discussing the benefits of self-help
groups for cocaine addicts who cannot get medical treatment or for whom medical
treatment was not successful).
244 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
241 See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
246 See TWELVE STEPS, supra note 12, at 55-62 (discussing Step Five and the
requirement to admit and take responsibility for past wrongs).
247 See Meyer & Smith, supra note 120, at 639-40 (concluding from the results of
a questionnaire that in the absence of confidentiality, individuals would be less likely
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results in the refusal of members to share information. If the
information is not disclosed to the group, the information is just as
unavailable as if a privilege were granted, yet the members receive
none of the therapeutic benefits from mutual aid. Thus, we are
thwarting the healing process and obtaining no benefit in terms of
truth and justicel Furthermore, to the extent the benefit derived
from the litigation is rehabilitation 45 and prevention of future
injury, the self-help relationship achieves these goals without the
cost of litigation. The goal of the relationship is to control the
behavior that led to the illegal acts. By fostering this relationship,
rather than impeding it, some of the benefits of the criminal law
process are still realized.
B. The Privacy Rationale
In applying the privacy rationale, it is again apparent that a
privilege should be granted for certain self-help groups. People
joining self-help groups are sharing intimate details of their
lives.2 49 The Supreme Court, in recognizing zones of privacy, has
specifically focused on relationships within the family25 and the
sanctity of the human body.25 1 Membership in a group is like
membership in a family, and some group members feel closer to
each other than to their families.252  "The central citadels of
privacy are said, by many, to be marriage, the relation of client and
attorney, penitent and priest, and patient and physician; and if the
law does not protect them, then, a fortiori, it is claimed, little of
human privacy has warrant to claim protection."253 The group
therapy relationship is substantially similar to those relationships
that the commentators believe fall within these "zones of privacy."
The mutual aid relationship is private in that it requires anonymity,
to enter therapy and/or communicate certain information).
214 See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
249 See Slovenko, supra note 118, at 407 (explaining that psychotherapy encourages
the patient "to let down his guard and to reveal his inmost thoughts and feelings").
o See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,485 (1965) (upholding the right
to choose to use contraception in the marriage context).
211 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (upholding a woman's right to
an abortion).
212 See Slovenko, supra note 118, at 450 (relating a group therapy member's
conversation in which the member stated that "I might be closer to W-3 [a member
of the group] than to my own wife").
25 Id. at 423.
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the disclosures made are often of an intimate and personal nature,
and it is based on trust and mutual understanding.
The case law relating to the right to privacy has supported
privileges for physicians and therapists.
25 4  In Whalen v. Roe, 255
the Supreme Court stated that people have a right to privacy that
protects intimate and private details of their lives from being
revealed.2 56 This right to informational privacy, if it protects any
communications at all, should protect those communications made
in the course of therapy. The California Supreme Court held just
that in In re Ltfschutz. 25  Although the court was considering
individualized professional therapy in Ltfschutz, there is no differ-
ence between expectations of privacy for communications made in
the course of individual therapy and those made in the group
setting.2 8 Disclosures in both settings merit protection under the
right to privacy.
Critics of the privacy rationale argue that disclosures made in
the presence of large numbers of persons are, by definition, not
private.2 59 Despite the large number of people present at these
meetings, participants in group therapy expect that their relation-
ships will remain confidential and private. 260  Therefore, the
relationship retains its private nature.
261
Critics of the privacy rationale also note that privacy doctrine
has been narrowed, especially in Fourth Amendment cases.
262
See supra notes 139-46 and accompanying text.
429 U.S. 589 (1977).
2. See id. at 599.
-7 467 P.2d 557, 567 (Cal. 1970) (holding that a patient's right to confidentiality
with her psychotherapist is protected within the zone of privacy recognized in
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965)).
"' See supra notes 231-34 and accompanying text.
259 See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
o See supra notes 227-32 and accompanying text.
261 Only one case has addressed this issue. In State v. Andring, 342 N.W.2d 128,
134 (Minn. 1984), the Minnesota Supreme Court found that staff personnel who were
present during group therapy could exercise the privilege. The court noted that
"participants in group psychotherapy sessions are not casual third persons who are
strangers to the... relationship. Rather, every participant has such a relationship
with the attending professional .... " Id. at 133. A handful of courts have utilized
a similar rationale in cases involving family therapy. See, e.g., Sims v. State, 311 S.E.2d
161, 165-66 (Ga. 1984) (holding that the trial court correctly held that statements
made by the victim in the course of marital therapy were privileged because "the
victim was a necessary participant in the psychiatric sessions"); Daymude v. State, 540
N.E.2d 1263, 1268 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that the psychotherapist-patient
privilege extends to statements made by a defendant to his doctor in the course of
court-ordered family counseling sessions).2"2See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (finding that there is
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Whalen's articulation of the informational privacy right, however, is
premised not on Fourth Amendment privacy rights but on substan-
tive due process privacy rights, an outgrowth of Griswold and its
progeny.
2 6 3
Decisions regarding what information or which activities merit
protection under a right-to-privacy rationale have been inconsistent
and do not provide a bright line test?' to determine when the
right to privacy outweighs other state interests. Without such a
bright line test, the relationship between members of a self-help
group-similar in many ways to a confessional or to a conversation
between a doctor and patient-should be deemed private and thus
protectable.
C. The Functionalist Rationale
The functionalist's perspective probably presents the strongest
case for affording a privilege to those self-help groups that counsel
their members. Society, by approving a privilege for attorneys,
priests, doctors, and therapists, has made it clear that it places value
on the counseling function. There are various ways in which the
self-help group functions as a counselor to its members. The group
provides:
1. Peer or primary group reference identification.
2. Learning through action; attitude and knowledge change
through experience and action.
3. Facilitation of communication because members are peers.
4. Enhanced opportunities for socialization.
6. Emotional and social support of members by one another;
reduction of social distance among them as compared with the
distance traditionally maintained from agency staff or profes-
sionals.
265
no Fourth Amendment interest in checks, deposits, and other bank records);
California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 69-70 (1974) (same).
' See Francis S. Chlapowski, Note, The Constitutional Protection of Informational
Privacy, 71 B.U. L. REv. 133, 146 (1991) (discussing the Supreme Court's analysis in
Whalen concerning the right to informational privacy).
2 But see United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir.
1980) (identifying eight factors to consider in making the privacy right determination:
the type of record requested, the information contained therein, the harm in
nondisclosure, the injury to the relationship generating the information, the adequacy
of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure, the need for access, statutory
mandate, and public policy or public interest).
265 KATz, supra note 33, at 34.
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There can be no doubt that functionally, self-help groups and
psychotherapist-patient relationships are very similar. Both serve to
achieve the same end-providing emotional relief in the form of
counseling in aid of treatment to their patients. Although the self-
help mechanism utilizes a different therapeutic process than the
professional setting, the former process is effective for many
people. 266 Members of the group are counselors for one another
just as much as a trained therapist is a counselor for her individual
patient.
Critics argue that members of the self-help group are not
serving the same function as professionals because they, unlike
professional psychiatrists and psychologists, lack adequate training.
The functionalist rationale, however, is not concerned with
credentials; rather, those who advocate a privilege from the
functionalist perspective are primarily concerned with the counsel-
ing and healing function itself. 267 Furthermore, even though they
lack formal training, members of self-help groups are able to
counsel each other because they possess experiential training,
268
an asset which professional therapists lack. This training, although
different from the professional's, enables the self-help member to
counsel other members just as effectively as a professionally trained
therapist.269 The relationship is premised solely on its "curative"
aspect.
Other critics argue that self-help members are not serving the
same function as therapists, because those present at meetings are
there to undergo treatment for themselves, not to help others.
These critics miss the mark. Participants in group therapy serve a
dual function-they are helping themselves by helping others. By
sharing their stories with others, people are being empowered. No
participant in group therapy is a mere bystander; rather, she is
acting as both therapist and patient. The success of group therapy
is in part due to the helping function. Thus, a patient can only treat
herself by treating others.270 Just because the self-help member
266 See Kurtz, supra note 38, at 107.08 (reporting the general consensus that A.A.
is an effective means to recovery for those who attend meetings over time); Meyer &
Smith, supra note 120, at 639-41 (arguing that group therapy is effective and deserves
to be accorded the same privilege as private psychotherapy); Bohlen, supra note 24,
at 34 (documenting the triumphs of self-help groups for cocaine addicts).267 See Fisher, supra note 151, at 612; Developments, supra note 129, at 1491.
26 Seesupra notes 44-49 and accompanying text (discussing experiential training).
26 9 See POWELL, supra note 42, at 33-37 (discussing the effectiveness of autonomous
self-help organizations based on various studies).
27 See id. at 127 (explaining that in the self-help context, "helping and receiving
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is not serving a singular function is no reason to deny a privilege.
Even though some members may be more functional than others,
it is the group as a whole that provides the experiential insight
which doctors often lack and which makes group therapy so success-
ful.271
Although few of the currently recognized privileges can be
justified under all three rationales, a privilege for certain self-help
groups272 is merited under the utilitarian, privacy, and functional-
ist rationales. Nevertheless, no state has been willing to provide
such a blanket privilege.
2 73
IV. THE SELF-HELP GROUP PRIVILEGE: COUNTERARGUMENTS,
LIMITATIONS, AND SUGGESTIONS
A. The Proposed Solution
There are some significant problems with according a privilege
to all self-help groups. Some self-help groups are not designed to
provide counseling. Other self-help groups do not require
confidentiality in order to function effectively. Thus, not all self-
help groups meet the criteria necessitated by the utilitarian, privacy,
and functionalist rationales.
help, to an important extent, are inseparable").
" Also under the functionalist rationale, it may be noted that to the extent self-
help groups serve a confessional function, they serve a function similar to priests.
The self-help group meeting, like a confessional, is a place where one can talk of her
transgressions without fear of ostracism or judgment.
2" This Comment does not advocate creating a privilege to all self-help groups.
Only those groups that require confidentiality and that provide treatment for
behavioral problems or addictions (Type I groups) are meant to be included within
the privilege. For a discussion regarding which groups should be afforded a privilege,
see infra part IV.A.
' Only one state has explicitly provided a privilege for members of group
therapy. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-10 7(g) (1987 & Supp. 1994) (stating that a
licensed psychologist, her staff, and persons who have participated in psychological
therapy shall not testify regarding confidential communications without consent).
However, the statute only allows for the privilege to obtain when a licensed
professional is present. The privilege is viewed as an extension of the psychothera-
pist-patient privilege. Requiring a professional's presence hardly seems justifiable
given the similarity between professional and nonprofessional group therapy. It is the
relationship of the parties involved, not the degree of education, that determines
whether the relationship should be privileged. Nevertheless, the Colorado statute
requires that a professional be present.
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Providing a privilege in the group context would be a rare
extension of a privilege to a relationship in which more than two
people are involved. Because this extension could potentially
represent a significant expansion of the law of privilege, the self-
help privilege should only be afforded to those groups that merit a
privilege under all three rationales.
To be accorded a privilege under the utilitarian rationale, the
group would have to show that its members expect confidentiality
and that confidentiality is an essential aspect of that group's
therapeutic process. The group would be required to demonstrate
that the greater community deems self-help group relationship
worthy of special protection. Finally, the group would have to show
that disclosure would be so detrimental to its successful functioning
as to overcome the presumption in favor of complete disclosure in
litigation proceedings.
27 4
The privacy rationale would require the group to show that its
purpose is to enable its members to share personal, intimate
feelings and issues. An outer-focused group 275 whose goal is to
raise public awareness could not invoke a privilege under the
privacy rationale. Only those groups that require the formation of
an intimate relationship and only those communications made in
confidence as part of this relationship would be protected. 7 6
Finally, the group would have to meet the functionalist rationale
requirements. In order to be accorded a privilege under the
functionalist rationale, the self-help organization would have to
serve a counseling function that requires disclosure of, and provides
treatment for, some type of behavioral problem. Only those
communications made solely in pursuance of the therapeutic
relationship would be privileged under the functionalist
rationale.7 7
24 See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 132, § 2285, at 527 (setting forth the utilitarian
rationale).
2 See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text (describing differences between
inner- and outer-focused groups).
"7 See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) (requiring communica-
tions to be confidential in nature in order for them to merit a privilege); TWELVE
STEPS, supra note 12, at 65 (listing Traditions Eleven and Twelve which require
anonymity in the A.A. relationship).2
" See supra note 221 and accompanying text; supra note 202 (listing cases in
which the doctor-patient privilege was accorded only when the communications were
made in the course of seeking counseling or treatment); cf. supra text accompanying
note 192 (requiring the priest-penitent communication to be functionally pertinent
in order to obtain a privilege).
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1. To Whom Does the Privilege Belong?
The privilege should lie with the self-help group member whose
confidence is sought to be disclosed. It is not the role of another
group member to determine when a confidence may or may not be
betrayed. If one member has stated something in the therapeutic
context, it is that member who may choose when and if that
confidence may be revealed, not those to whom she entrusted her
revelation.
278
2. The Privilege Itself
The privilege advocated could be enacted by a legislature in the
following form:
A privilege vests in a member of a self-help group, to prevent
other members of that group from testifying about disclosures
made in the context of the group relationship, when and only
when:
1. The self-help group meets the utilitarian rationale set forth by
Wigmore:
"(1)The communications must originate in a confidence that
they will not be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full
and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the
parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the
community ought to be sedulouslyfostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclo-
sure of the communications must be greater than the benefit
278 This is the way most courts have traditionally extended privileges. There is a
reluctance on the part of many courts to accord the privilege to the professional
rather than the person disclosing the information. See, e.g., In re Lifschutz, 467 P.2d
557, 572-73 (Cal. 1970) (providing a privacy rationale justification for creating a
psychotherapist-patient privilege in the patient but refusing to extend a privilege
directly to the therapist). Only the priest-penitent privilege and the husband-wife
privilege vest the privilege in the hands of the listener, and this is so only in some
states and/or in certain types of cases. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.504(3) (West
1979) (stating that there is no privilege in cases brought by one spouse against
another or in certain criminal proceedings); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 209.060 (Michie
1991) (stating that the husband-wife privilege does not exclude evidence in cases
regarding abuse, neglect, or exploitation of an adult); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.11
(Michie 1995) (stating that the husband-wife privilege does not apply in child abuse
cases).
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thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation";
2 79
and
2. The disclosure is made in the context of seeking treatment,
counseling or a similar function for a disease, addiction or
compulsion that impairs the member's judgment; and
3. The very purpose of the relationship is solely the treatment of
that disease, addiction or compulsion; and
4. The disclosure was made with the expectation of privacy and
confidentiality and the relationship cannot survive without the
disclosure.
The privilege vests in the member who disclosed the information.
Reasonable courts will differ about the purposes of various
groups. Case-by-case analysis will inevitably result in some confu-
sion. The National Self-Help Clearinghouse 280 might be a useful
resource for understanding how each self-help group perceives itself
and its functions and goals. With the help of the Clearinghouse, the
legislature could formulate more concrete guidelines in order to
define which groups should be accorded a privilege.
28 1
B. Feasibility of Extending the Privilege: Limitations and
Extensions of Current Privilege Law
Courts and legislatures are very reluctant to create or extend
privileges since testimonial privileges result in the exclusion of
relevant and material evidence. Nevertheless, the courts have
extended privileges when faced with compelling arguments to do
SO.
28 2
One of the largest areas in which courts and legislatures have
been willing to extend the privilege is in the context of rape crisis
279 8 WIGMORE, supra note 132, § 2285, at 527.
2'80 For a discussion of the National Self-Help Clearinghouse, see GARTNER &
RIESSMAN, supra note 25, at viii.
281 The guidelines might include more precise instructions on how to meet the
requirements set forth in each rationale. For example, Wigmore's third prong, the
requirement of community acceptance, might be more clearly defined in terms of
group recognition by the Self-Help Clearinghouse, number of members, treatment
effectiveness rates, etc. The formulation of such explicit definitions is left to policy-
makers and is beyond the scope of this Comment.
282 See e.g., People v. District Court, 719 P.2d 722, 727 n.3 (Colo. 1986) (en banc)
(holding that communications made to rape crisis counselors are absolutely
privileged); In re Kryschuk, 14 D.L.R.2d 676, 677 (Sask. Magis. Ct. 1958) (concluding
that a privilege should be accorded to social workers under a strict application of the
utilitarian rationale); see also Ayala & Martyn, supra note 182, at 166 (stating that
courts are reluctant to create new privileges).
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counseling. Court decisions and statutory law have made it very
difficult for rape defendants to obtain access to records of rape
victims' conversations with rape counselors. 28 3  Although the
psychotherapist-patient privilege has often been construed to apply
only to licensed therapists, courts and legislatures have also been
willing to extend the privilege to unlicensed counselors in rape
cases.
284
Extension of the privilege has been justified under both the
privacy and functionalist rationales. The privacy rationale argues
that a woman who has been raped has been intimately violated. To
subject her discussions with a counselor to scrutiny by the alleged
rapist is allowing the victim to be raped twice, as her privacy is
being invaded for the second time.2 5 From the functionalist
perspective, a rape crisis counselor serves a function similar to a
doctor or psychotherapist.
28 6
As a result of these functionalist and privacy rationales, many
states have passed rape shield laws which grant either a qualified or
absolute privilege to rape crisis counselors.287 The same privacy
and functionalist rationales have recently been invoked to extend
privileges to social workers, teachers, and marital counselors.
2 88
285 See, e.g., People v. District Court, 719 P.2d at 727 n.3 (holding that communica-
tions between rape victims and counselors are absolutely privileged); infra note 287
and accompanying text (discussing the prevalence of rape shield laws).
284 See, e.g., Ky. R. EVID. 506 (including sexual assault counselors in counselor-
client privilege); People v. District Court, 719 P.2d at 727 n.3 (holding that
communications between rape victims and counselors are absolutely privileged); see
also In re Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, 428 A.2d 126, 146 (Pa. 1981) (Larsen, J.,
dissenting) (stating that it is not the individual therapist but the therapeutic function
that the privilege is designed to protect). The result in Pittsburgh Action was
statutorily overruled by 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5945.1 (1982 & Supp. 1995),
which provides an absolute privilege to rape crisis counselors.
2 See George McEvoy, Rape Rulings Allow Victims to Be Attacked, PALM BEACH
POST, Sept. 5, 1994, at 17A.
" See Developments, supra note 129, at 1549-51 (discussing the lack of coherence
in current privilege law given the similarity of functions between certain profession-
als).
287 All but five states have passed rape shield statutes. See Tanford & Bocchino,
supra note 129, at 592 (showing that as of 1980, Arizona, Connecticut, Maine, Utah,
and Virginia have not passed rape shield statutes).
288 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-154(a) (West 1986 & Supp. 1995)
(teacher-student privilege concerning drug and alcohol abuse); IND. CODE ANN. § 20-
6.1-6-15 (West 1995) (guidance counselor-student privilege); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 622.10 (West 1950 & Supp. 1995) (protecting school guidance counselors and
persons holding a master's degree in social work or counseling); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 233, § 20J (Law. Co-op. 1986 & Supp. 1995) (protecting sexual assault counselors);
N.Y. CIv. PRAc. L. & R. 4508 (McKinney 1992) (protecting social workers); N.C. GEN.
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It may seem as though privileges are on the rise; however, the
practical application of many privileges has been hampered as more
statutes are passed that place limits on the scope of the available
privileges. Many states have determined that the privilege must be
overridden in cases of child abuse28 9 and elder abuse. 290 Courts
and legislatures have also narrowed the doctor-patient privilege by
requiring disclosure in certain situations. 291 Thus, in recent years,
privilege law has been narrowed.
29 2
This inconsistency, extending privileges in some cases and
narrowing it in others, makes it difficult to predict whether courts
STAT. §§ 8-53.4, .5, .7, .8 (1986 & Supp. 1994) (protecting school counselors, marital
and family therapists, social workers, and licensed counselors).
Various legal scholars have noted the need for greater protection for these and
other professionals. See e.g., David B. Brushwood, Is There a Pharmacist-Patient
Privilege?, 12 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 63,67 (1984) (arguing that pharmacists who
counsel patients on the proper uses of drugs should be protected by the privilege);
Maureen B. Hogan, Note, The Constitutionality of an Absolute Privilege for Rape Crisis
Counseling: A Criminal Defendant's Sixth Amendment Rights Versus a Rape Victim's Right
to Confidential Therapeutic Counseling, 30 B.C. L. REV. 411,413 (1989) (explaining that
the extension of privilege to rape crisis counselors promotes a variety of social goals
including the recovery of the victim and the prosecution of attackers); Chauncey B.
Wood, Note, Rape Prosecutions and Privileged Psychological Counselling Records: How
Much Does a Defendant Have a Right to Know About His Accuser?, 3 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J.
351, 372 (1993) (noting that an absolute privilege for rape victims' psychological
counseling records would encourage more victims to seek counseling and would
increase the number of reports of rape).
Accountants have unsuccessfully attempted to advocate for an accountants'
privilege. They argue that accountants are functionally similar to attorneys in their
need for confidentiality to perform their duties effectively. Still, most courts have yet
to accept the notion. See, e.g., Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973)
(finding that federal common law does not recognize an accountant-client privilege);
United States v. Wainwright, 413 F.2d 796, 803 (10th Cir. 1969) (same), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1009 (1970).
2. For example in Kentucky, a statute requires that anyone who knows of child
abuse must report it to the local or state authorities. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 620.030 (1), (2) (Michie 1990). Similar reporting laws exist in many other states,
rendering the privilege a nullity in many cases.
2" For a complete list of child abuse and elder abuse reporting laws, see BUSH &
TIEMANN, supra note 183, app. II (child abuse), app. III (elder abuse).
"I See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-602 (Michie 1987) (requiring disclosure of
medical information when dealing with gun and knife wounds); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L.
& R. 4504(b) (McKinney 1992) (eliminating the privilege where a patient under 16
years of age has been the victim of a crime); State v. Efird, 309 S.E.2d 228, 230-31
(N.C. 1983) (holding that a defendant could not assert a privilege to conceal a
venereal disease in the case of a child abuse accusation).
' A fuller discussion of the limitations on the scope of the privileges and the
practical problems that arise as a result of these limitations is beyond the scope of this
Comment. For a more detailed discussion of the difficulties inherent in limiting
privileges, see Smith, supra note 130, at 502-22.
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and legislatures will be willing to create a self-help privilege. A
close examination of the criticisms surrounding the self-help
privilege, however, will reveal that the privilege should obtain.
C. Some Criticisms and Responses
1. They've Survived So Far...
The first question critics pose is: if this privilege is so vital, how
is it that self-help groups have survived until now without any such
privilege? There are two responses to this criticism.
First, many people were unaware that such a legal privilege was
lacking. Few cases have received the same amount of publicity as
the Cox case has received.293 The reaction to the Cox case makes
it clear that people were shocked that no legal protection -was
afforded to the group.9 4 As most of the studies indicate, people
are unaware of and indifferent to the origin of the protection of
communications, so long as the protection is there. 29 5 They are
not well-versed in the legal difference between privilege and
confidentiality. This partially explains why self-help groups have
survived without the privilege. However, therapists are concerned
that "one celebrated case, should it arise, would create a great deal
of anxiety about group therapy."2 6 Cox could be such a case.
The reaction to the Cox case demonstrates that members of self-
help groups believed that their disclosures were untouchable. As a
result of the decision, people may now be less willing to disclose
personal information necessary for treatment.
The second reason that self-help has survived until now without
the privilege has to do with two factors inherent in the interaction
of the group. The first factor may be called "positive pressure."
Despite the large numbers of people participating in self-help
293 In fact, there is only one other case that raised the issue whether A.A.
conversations were privileged information. See supra note 233 (discussing the Boobar
case). This case received relatively little publicity and, therefore, probably did not
have a profound effect on group members' attitudes and beliefs.
' See supra notes 17-26 and accompanying text (explaining that people turn to
self-help groups as a place to discuss personal secrets because they believe that their
confessions will be held inviolable).
' See supra note 239 and accompanying text; see also supra note 122 and
accompanying text (explaining a study which found that patients, and even
psychotherapists, were ignorant of the law on privilege for their communications and
that patients expected the "moral promise" of confidentiality in group therapy to
prevent disclosure).
, Slovenko, supra note 118, at 429.
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groups, breaches of confidentiality are rare."' People realize that
a trust is being placed in them. They appreciate the importance of
the confidence because at some point they may need that outlet
themselves and they would have felt betrayed if their confidences
were disclosed." 8 Because members of these groups have such a
strong trust in each other, they may believe, correctly, that their co-
patients will generally not disclose their confidences.
The second interactive force may be referred to as "negative
pressure." "What protects confidentiality among group members,
more than anything else, is that each group member has something
on the other, and that is a deterrent against disclosure. ... She has
something on him and he has something on her. They keep their
secrets."29 9 Similarly, in the course of an interview, one patient of
a psychotherapy group stated, "If anyone in the group would say
anything about me, I'd talk about them. I mean, it's worked since
I was in grade school. You shut up about me, I shut up about
you."
0 0
Thus, it is apparent that the interaction of both positive and
negative pressure within the group context makes people very
secure that their confidences will not be revealed. When these
interactive forces are combined with people's ignorance of the law
of privilege, group members' assurances of confidentiality are
understandably strong. In other words, peoplejustifiably place faith
in the other group members not to reveal their confidences.
Indeed, they may be completely correct that under almost any
circumstance the members will not reveal these confidences.
They may not know, however, that absent a privilege, other
group members can be compelled by a court to reveal these
confidences. Therefore, the combination of the patients' trust in
each other with their imperfect knowledge of the legal system's
ability to compel disclosure of these confidences, may have allowed
self-help groups, which rely on confidentiality for their very
existence, to survive without an actual legal privilege. After the Cox
case, and the publicity it received, the functioning of self-help
groups may be seriously impaired due to participants' increased
" See id. at 409 (describing the overwhelming number of therapists reporting no
knowledge of breaches of confidentiality within the group therapy context).
"a See id. at 428-29 (recognizing that group members are not likely to reveal
confidences because they understand the importance of confidentiality in the process
of therapy).
2Id. at 428.
so Id. at 441.
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awareness that their confidences may be revealed despite their trust
in fellow patients.3"'
2. It's a Slippery Slope
A second criticism of the mutual aid group's privilege is that if
courts are to allow self-help groups to receive an evidentiary
privilege, where will the line be drawn? There is unquestionably a
problem in determining which groups are worthy of protection.
The simple answer to this criticism is that a firm line has been
drawn by the proposal set forth in this Comment-in applying all
three rationales,30 2 groups that should not receive a privilege will
not.
Indeed, there will be some legitimate groups that do not require
confidentiality for their survival that will not be accorded protection
because they fail to meet the rationales' requirements. For example,
a group like the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, a self-help
group designed to combat discrimination against gays and lesbians,
would not be protected. Since the goal of the Task Force is
advocacy for social change,303 the group necessarily is public
rather than private. Therefore, it fails to meet the test set forth in
the privacy and utilitarian rationales regarding the expectation of
confidentiality and privacy.
Similarly, speaking with a best friend might be entitled to a
privilege under the privacy rationale, but it fails under a functional-
ist rationale since, when seeking the advice of a friend, one is
seeking just that-advice. The sole function of the friendship is not
counseling or treatment for the problem. The treatment is only one
aspect of the relationship and thus fails to meet part three of the
proposed statute. Furthermore, disclosure is not necessary for the
adequate functioning of that relationship. Thus, such a disclosure
would fail to gain protection under the utilitarian rationale.
A case-by-case analysis will certainly be required to determine
whether the self-help privilege will obtain. Such an analysis,
"'1 See Leila M. Foster, Group Psychotherapy: A Pool of Legal Witnesses?, 25 INT'LJ.
GROUP PSYCHOTHERAPY 50, 50 (1975) (providing a hypothetical example of why
members of group therapy would not attend therapy if they thought confidentiality
was at issue).
' See supra part II.A. (discussing the rationales for granting an evidentiary
privilege).
Mo See POWELL, supra note 42, at 321 (describing the goals of various "lifestyle"
organizations).
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however, is required not only among self-help groups but also
among all relationships that serve purposes similar to those
currently protected. When the privilege is analyzed under each of
the three rationales, not meeting one of the three will usually
preclude the granting of a privilege to an illegitimate group.
Although it may seem inefficient, if concrete guidelines are
proffered, the case-by-case analysis will be fairly straightforward and
not very time-consuming, certainly no more inefficient than the
examination that occurs when courts determine whether any
currently recognized privilege applies to confidential communica-
tions.
3. There's No Duty to Warn
Professionals have a duty to disclose if their client is planning to
harm someone else. 0 4 Currently, there is no similar duty imposed
upon laypeople or members of self-help groups 0 5 Therefore, if
a member discloses a plan to commit future harm at a self-help
group meeting, there is no duty imposed upon the other self-help
members to protect the person who might potentially be harmed.
Since there is no responsibility imposed upon group members, there
is a reluctance to accord them any privilege.
Self-help groups focus on changes in behavior. People who
come to self-help groups are admitting past events.30 6 They are
there to prevent themselves from recommitting past bad acts, not
to plan future ones. Furthermore, a privilege would not prevent a
group member from disclosing information to a threatened
individual. The decision whether to inform someone who may be
in danger is in no way affected by the presence or absence of a
privilege. The privilege only prevents testimony in a court of law
but would not preclude disclosure to threatened individuals.
0 7
' See Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 340 (Cal. 1976)
(requiring a psychotherapist to disclose information if the therapist discovers that her
client may pose a serious threat of danger to another).
5 See id. (requiring only professionals to disclose but imposing no similar duty
on laypersons).
' See supra note 65 and accompanying text (describing the twelve steps of
admitting past mistakes and controlling negative behavior).
' 7 See Appelbaum & Greer, supra note 21, at 312 (noting that "[n]o state has a law
requiring patients to protect the confidentiality of their fellow patients, and we know
of no court decision establishing such a duty").
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4. Other Evidentiary Rules Will Take Care of It
Some critics argue that a privilege is not necessary because other
evidentiary rules will prevent the disclosure of the revelation.
30 8
Oftentimes, the information sought to be revealed can be precluded
on other grounds such as relevance, materiality, 0 9 or compe-
tence.1l Although the privilege may overlap with these other
grounds in some cases, it does not do so in all cases.31 Further-
more, if other rules will prevent the disclosure, then the presence
of the privilege is not problematic; if the privilege is duplicative,
then society should provide the privilege merely to show its support
and belief in the importance of the self-help movement.
5. Law and Order
Finally, critics argue that the value of the truth-finding process
outweighs any benefit obtained from self-help group treatment.
This criticism is essentially a question of fundamental values, and in
today's society where law and order is paramount, it can be very
compelling. The truth-finding process, however, is not significantly
impeded by the presence of a privilege. The people who witnessed
the crime are not being silenced. Self-help group members are
aware of the crime only because of the confidential nature of the
discussion within the group. Without the promise of confidentiality,
the information regarding the illegal act would likely not be
shared. 12 Furthermore, since "[t]he broad aim of the criminal law
is... to prevent harm to society,"313 fostering, rather than imped-
ing the relationship designed to control the crime-causing behavior
would better serve society's goal of preventing future harm.
3 14
" See Slovenko, supra note 210, at 672-73.
30 See FED. R. EviD. 402-403 (setting forth the standards for the admissibility of
relevant evidence).
s10 See generally FED. R. EVID. art. VI (providing guidelines regarding exclusion of
testifying witnesses due to incompetency).
"1 See generally GREEN & NESSON, supra note 29, at 689 (stating that privilege rules
exclude relevant evidence and that there will thus be cases in which the information
is relevant and can only be excluded by virtue of the privilege).
3" See supra note 210 and accompanying text (explaining that group members will
be less likely to reveal personal information if those revelations are not legally
protected).
3s LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 167, at 10.
Si4 See id. at 24.
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CONCLUSION
Certain relationships in our society-attorney-client, priest-
penitent, doctor-patient, and psychotherapist-patient-have been
accorded special protection in the eyes of the law. Various
rationales explain why these relationships have been deemed
privileged. The creation of a self-help group privilege for those self-
help groups that require confidentiality and that provide counseling
treatment comports with current privilege law doctrine. The self-
help group is a modem phenomenon that has helped large numbers
of people overcome serious behavioral problems. By granting a
privilege to this relationship, society would be expressing a belief in
the efficacy of these groups. Refusal to grant a privilege could
seriously impair the functioning of self-help groups and would not
result in any significant gain for the truth-finding process. There-
fore, the courts and legislatures, in line with current privilege
rationales, should work to create clear guidelines to determine the
scope and applicability of a self-help group privilege. Self-help
groups are a wonderful resource for so many people. Granting
them a privilege will ensure their continued success and efficacy.

